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Bridging the Partisan Divide

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Party ideology, party affiliation and organized activity by political parties are institutionalized elements of the political system in Oregon and throughout the nation.
While most Oregonians would likely agree that our system dominated by two parties
historically has served our state well, many Oregonians have voiced concerns about
the nature and extent of partisan behavior and its effect on the functioning of state
government.
City Club’s Research Board and Board of Governors charged your committee with
determining if and when partisan behavior is an impediment to effective governance
and, if so, what should be done about it. The primary objectives of the study were to
(1) define partisanship and investigate its impact on Oregon’s political system and
state government’s ability to effectively govern and resolve key issues and (2) recommend possible solutions for any negative impacts of partisanship, as well as ways to
support elements of the political system that should be continued.
Although this report examines the problem of excessive partisanship in numerous
spheres — within the electorate, within party organizations and within government
— its main focus is within government, and more specifically within the Legislature.
Your committee readily accepted the inherent difficulties of trying to define a
subjective concept such as “partisanship” and its corollary behaviors. Nevertheless,
after interviewing numerous witnesses and conducting considerable research, your
committee settled upon the following definitions of “partisanship” and “excessive
partisanship”: “Partisanship” is the party allegiance that results from shared values,
identities, and goals. When partisanship functions well, it serves to help develop competing visions of what is best for Oregon, produce meaningful deliberation, and focus
the activities of voters and legislators from different parties. “Excessive partisanship,”
by contrast, is the elevation of party allegiance to such a degree that it interferes with
the ability of the Legislature to function well. Partisanship becomes excessive when
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state legislators base their decisions on building and maintaining party power rather
than on promoting the interests of the public at large.
Your committee found that experts disagree as to whether the nature of partisanship
in Oregon has changed significantly in recent years. In fact, partisan behavior has
waxed and waned over the years, for many reasons, and your committee suspects this
pattern will continue. Nonetheless, your committee also concluded that it is reasonable for citizens to try to moderate behaviors and practices that inhibit effective
lawmaking before and when they occur.
Frequent reports of incessant bickering, mean-spirited attacks on fellow legislators
and distortion of information came to mind far more quickly for too many people
than did collegiality among lawmakers, reasonable compromise and fair and accurate
use of information. Although members of Oregon’s legislative and executive branches
are often capable and have demonstrated the ability to work together in a bipartisan
manner, excessive partisanship occurs all too frequently and is especially disabling
when the state confronts controversial issues that attract the public’s attention. In
these cases, excessive partisanship represents a substantial obstacle to addressing
some of the state’s most pressing problems, leads to voter disaffection with the political process and discourages qualified individuals from seeking public office.
As previously mentioned, much of this report identifies and discusses the factors
that contribute to excessive partisanship in the Oregon Legislature. Some of these
factors are readily apparent. Limited and poor media coverage of the political system
and a public that is poorly informed about legislative processes and policy issues both
contribute to excessive partisanship. Strong interest groups aligned with either the
Democrats or the Republicans also reinforce excessive partisanship by pressuring
legislators to commit to uncompromising agendas.
Other factors contributing to excessive partisanship, however, are less readily apparent. Surprisingly, your committee found that the greatest concentrations of partisanbased power are not where it expected to find them. Oregon’s Republican and Democratic state parties are grass roots organizations that serve the valuable function of
involving citizens in the political process, but they have little direct involvement in
the state Legislature. Rather, legislative party caucuses, caucus leaders and presiding
officers wield the greatest amount of partisan power and influence in Oregon. Legislative caucus leaders and the presiding officers possess more power than the state parties when it comes to pressuring legislators to support the partisan agendas.
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Because of the structure of Oregon’s Legislature, which is characterized by a strongleader system, leaders have tremendous discretion for establishing the degree of partisanship. As most of Oregon’s legislative rules are subject to revision by simple-majority
vote, they can be — and have been — easily manipulated to satisfy the immediate demands of the majority party in a particular house. Oregon’s legislative rules currently
give undue authority to its presiding officers, who can easily use these rules to control
both committee assignments and the movement of legislation in a way that demands
loyalty from majority party members and that excludes members of the minority party
from a meaningful role in the legislative process. While committees remain important
in the Legislature, their power has somewhat diminished because of the increasing
power of the caucuses. Ostensibly nonpartisan administrative staff officers are also
subject to the imperatives of the party in control of a particular house.
This report considers various electoral reforms that have been proposed, including
nonpartisan elections, the top-two primary, instant run-off voting, multi-member
districts and fusion voting; campaign finance reforms such as public ownership
and financing of elections, campaign spending limits and contribution limits; and
redistricting reform. For most of these proposed reforms, your committee concluded
that there was not sufficient information to recommend for or against any proposed
reform. Your committee concluded, however, that alternative elections systems are
worth exploring and that the process of redistricting can be influenced by partisan
considerations, giving the party in power at the time of redistricting a tool to increase
its power in a way that does not accurately represent the wishes of the voters.
Your committee also concluded that a deterioration of legislators’ relationships with
one another and an increased lack of civility have occurred in recent years. These in
turn have adversely impacted the deliberative process of the Legislature.
Your committee believes that the following recommendations will mitigate the
problem of excessive partisanship and make Oregon’s political system function more
effectively:
Administration of the Legislature
1.

The Legislature should hold pre-session conference retreats to provide more
training and more opportunities for legislators to forge lasting and productive
professional relationships across party lines.

2.

The Legislature should continue to build upon its efforts to conduct legislative
business in communities throughout the state and to publish information and
proceedings online.
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Legislative Rules and Procedure
3.

The House and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that establish proportional representation of party members on committees and permit the leaders
of each caucus to determine which of its members to appoint to committees.
When making committee assignments, caucus leaders should take into account the experience, interest and seniority of legislators.

4.

The House and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that require the vicechair of each committee to be a member of the minority party, and committee
chairs should consult with vice-chairs in developing committee agendas.

5.

While the House’s Teamwork Bill is a step in the right direction, the House
and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that allow each member of the
Legislature to require a committee hearing on a predetermined number of bills
during each legislative session.

6.

The House should maintain and the Senate should adopt rules permitting a
majority of each of their members to require a committee or floor hearing on
a bill and, in addition, permitting a substantial minority of each of their members to require a committee or floor hearing on a bill that has already been
passed by the other chamber.

7.

The House should maintain and the Senate should adopt rules ensuring that
the Secretary of the Senate and the Chief Clerk of the House are nonpartisan
and serve members of both parties, not at the sole discretion of the presiding
officers. In addition, the House and Senate should employ permanent staff
with knowledge of substantive policy areas to support the work of committees.

8.

Once the above rules are adopted, the House and Senate should require a supermajority to change these and other rules that protect each member’s right
to participate in the legislative process.

Constitutional Amendments
9.

The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment establishing
a nonpartisan redistricting commission.

10. The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment that would
establish annual legislative sessions of limited length, commencing in March,
shortly after the state Office of Economic Analysis releases its first revenue
projections for the year.
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11. The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment that would
establish four-year terms for members of the House of Representatives and
six-year terms for members of the Senate.
Further Study and Advocacy
12. City Club of Portland should establish a research committee to study alternative election systems.
13. City Club of Portland should establish a research committee to prepare a detailed recommendation for a nonpartisan redistricting commission.
14. City Club should support efforts to increase substantive and objective policy
news reporting in the media.
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INTRODUCTION
During election seasons, personal
attacks between candidates seem to
overshadow substantive communication
with the electorate. While the Legislature is in session, legislative division
and stalemate appear to make better
headlines than stories of compromise
and achievement. It is certainly true
that there has been a lot of discussion
of the negative effects of partisanship in
the past few years. In late 2005 Governor Ted Kulongoski and the Legislature
established the Public Commission on
the Legislature (PCOL) to examine the
effectiveness of the Legislature. One
of the issues that immediately came to
the attention of the PCOL was political
partisanship. Several prominent Oregon
politicians led the charge to examine
partisanship and how it has affected the
Legislature.

seen a sharp increase in partisanship
and disregard of other views as a major
source of decline in Oregon’s legislative
process and performance, leading the
Legislature to make faulty decisions or
preventing any decision at all.”
In March 2007 your committee asked
the opinion research firm Davis,
Hibbitts & Midghall, Inc., to poll five
hundred Oregon citizens in order to
determine their response to the following question: “Does the role of political
parties have a positive or negative effect
on state government?” Of those who
responded, 31 percent believed that
political parties have a positive effect,
while 51 percent believed that political
parties have a negative effect. Those
who thought political parties had a positive effect expressed two top reasons for
their view: parties “give people a choice”
and parties “identify issues and have
different stands on them.” Those who
thought political parties had a negative
effect listed two top reasons for their
position: parties pursue their own interests rather than the state’s interests,
and parties make it hard to reach agreement so nothing gets solved. Younger

On September 13, 2005, former Attorney General David Frohnmayer, a member of the PCOL, set out “seven aspects
of a ‘problem statement’ that an agenda
of legislative reform might address.”
Among those seven aspects was “political partisanship.” “Observers as well as
participants,” noted Frohnmayer, “have
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Percentage of Oregonians Who Believe Political Parties Have
a Positive or Negative Effect on State Government
10% “Strong Positive”
18% “Don’t Know/No Answer”

21% “Mild Positive”

28% “Strong Negative”
23% “Mild Negative”

Source: “City Club of Portland Partisanship Study Poll,” Davis, Hibbitts, & Midghall Inc.,
March 2007

voters tended to view political parties
more negatively than older voters.

The Meaning of Partisanship
and Excessive Partisanship

“blind, prejudiced and unreasoning allegiance,” while the term “partisanship”
has been described as “an attitude that
always favors one way of feeling or acting especially without considering any
other possibilities.”1 Your committee interviewed three local political scientists,
Professors Richard Clucas of Portland
State University, Robert Eisinger of
Lewis & Clark College, and Paul Gronke
of Reed College, who generally rejected
these pejorative associations, instead
defining the terms neutrally:

Some definitions of the words “partisan”
and “partisanship” have negative connotations. For example, the word “partisan” can mean someone who exhibits

Partisans are individuals who share
certain values, identify with a particular
political party, and possess a commitment to party goals.

During the course of this study, your
committee confronted the challenge of
defining partisanship, considering the
positive and negative consequences of
partisanship and identifying ways to
alleviate the negative effects of excessive
partisanship on the state. (See Appendix
A for the committee’s charge.)
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Partisanship is the party allegiance
that results from those shared values,
identities, and goals.

remains reasonably constrained, conflict
between the parties can be informative
and productive.

Your committee chose to adopt the
neutral definitions favored by these
academics because such definitions facilitate analysis of both the valuable and
destructive effects of political allegiance.

Despite the value of partisanship,
partisan behavior can become excessive,
thereby undermining effective lawmaking. While running as an Independent
for governor in 2006, then-Senator Ben
Westlund commented that partisanship
Your committee also concluded early in
was not inherently bad, but “like air and
its research that partisanship and the
water, too much can kill.” Similarly, the
two-party system
PCOL recognized
serve valuable functhat “partisan camtions by developing
paigns, elections
“For the purposes
competing visions
and organizations
of this study, your
of what is best for
play a critical and
committee defined
Oregon. Academic
constructive role
‘excessive partisanship’
witnesses generally
in the formation
as the elevation of party
of public policy,”
stated that partisanallegiance to such a level
but the commisthat
it
interferes
with
the
ship had worked
ability
of
the
Legislature
sion nevertheless
fairly well as a way
to
function
well.”
concluded that “an
to focus and orgaeffective Legislanize the activities of
ture encourages
the Legislature here
partisanship to be set aside for the best
and elsewhere. Tim Hibbitts, an indeinterests of the state.”2
pendent political analyst who appeared
before your committee several months
before his firm did the survey discussed
above, was of the opinion that having
two strong parties reduces political fragmentation when compared to multi-party democracies in other countries. Even
without official political parties, conflicts
between competing visions would naturally occur in our electoral and legislative
processes. Party labels serve as useful
guides to persons of similar backgrounds, values and interests who wish
to work together to accomplish common
goals. When electoral and legislative
processes work well and partisanship

For the purposes of this study, your
committee defined excessive partisanship as the elevation of party allegiance
to such a level that it interferes with
the ability of the Legislature to function well. Your committee identified
five characteristics of a well-functioning
electoral and legislative system:
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Ease of recruitment of well-qualified candidates for legislative
office.

2.

High electoral participation and
the election of legislators who
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serve all voters, not just those
affiliated with major parties or
strong special interests.
3.

Good relationships and civility
among legislators.

4.

Deliberation and resolution of
policy issues with input from the
majority and minority.

5.

Public respect for and confidence
in the Legislature.

their own individual judgment of what
is best for the state. They also neglect
good legislation that might otherwise
have broad public support. Furthermore, excessive partisanship degrades
the abilities of legislators to deliberate
and collaborate — abilities that are
essential to our legislative process. In
an excessively partisan Legislature, the
majority uses its control to consolidate
power and advance its agenda, while
the minority uses its limited rights to
stall and disrupt the majority’s agenda.
Either the majority successfully silences
the minority and advances its agenda
without real debate, or the minority successfully resists the majority’s agenda,
resulting in legislative gridlock. In the
meantime, both the majority and the
minority posture for the next election.
Finally, excessive partisanship corrodes
public trust in political institutions and
discourages otherwise promising candidates from running for legislative office.

This report focuses on excessive partisanship as it specifically affects the Oregon Legislature. None of the witnesses
your committee interviewed raised
concerns about partisanship affecting
any part of the government other than
the Legislature, with the sole exception
of the office of the secretar y
o f s tate w i t h res p e c t to re di tricting, as discussed later in this report.
Many county and city elected offices are
nonpartisan, with candidates’ political
affiliations not listed on the ballot. The
same is true of judicial elections. The
governor and other statewide executive
officials are elected on a partisan basis,
but they have a great deal of independence once in office. The Legislature is
particularly affected by partisanship
because members of both parties are
elected to the Legislature, and, once
there, they must compete for control at
some times and work together at other
times.

Distinguishing between partisanship
and excessive partisanship can sometimes be difficult. As he left Washington, D.C., Tom DeLay, the former
U.S. House Majority Leader, defended
intensely partisan politics, noting that
“partisanship properly understood, is
not a symptom of democracy’s weakness, but of its health and strength....”
While DeLay recognized that “politics
demands compromise,” he stated that
compromise and bipartisanship are
means and not ends and that “[i]t is not
the principled partisan, however obnoxious he may seem to his opponents,
who degrades the public debate, but the

Excessive partisanship in the Legislature
produces unwelcome outcomes. Excessively partisan legislators support their
party’s agenda even when it contradicts
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preening, self-styled statesman who elevates compromise to a first principle.”3

increase in that metric may not be a sign
of unhealthy partisanship. It could instead indicate changes in the issues that
matter to voters, or it could result from
demographic shifts. Researchers have
not tabulated how frequently votes in
the Legislature have divided along party
lines in Oregon. Even if that data were
available, the data would be difficult to
interpret. An increase in divided votes
would not necessarily indicate greater
partisanship, as presiding officers
control whether controversial bills even
receive a hearing. Your committee was
unable to identify any empirical basis
for determining whether excessive partisanship — as your committee defines
it — has risen in Oregon

The PCOL viewed matters differently
when it called attention to “[e]xcessive
partisanship at the expense of collaboration and creative problem solving.” In its
final report, the PCOL stated that the
“public perception is that non-constructive partisanship erodes public faith in
the Legislature and its ability to find
reasonable compromise.”
As noted at the beginning of this
chapter, partisanship is an essential and
positive feature of the legislative process. Partisanship helps political actors
develop and more precisely articulate
their values and goals. It helps forge
a sense of common identity among
otherwise isolated voters. Furthermore,
partisanship serves to focus political
activities of people with common values
and identities towards realization of
those shared goals. When partisanship
functions effectively in the Legislature, it results in a productive tension
between legislators from different
parties. That tension manifests itself in
meaningful deliberation, a willingness
to set aside dogmatism and personal
acrimony, and an openness to pragmatic
consensus-building and lawmaking.

Your committee heard many witnesses
express their opinions about excessive
partisanship. The perception of most
was that excessive partisanship has
been rising and has sometimes bitterly
divided the Legislature to the point of
dysfunction, but a strong and persuasive
minority disagreed.
Leading the opinion that partisanship
is not on the rise were the academic
witnesses, joined by several former or
current political insiders. They felt that
the Legislature functions reasonably
well and that partisanship as the public
knows it today is no more “excessive”
than it has been in the past. Professors
Clucas, Eisinger and Gronke acknowledged that political tactics and rhetoric
have changed in recent years, but they
generally agreed that partisanship
has been an historic part of American
politics. They observed peaks and valleys

Is Excessive Partisanship on
the Rise and Is It a Problem in
Oregon?
Partisanship is difficult to measure. Political scientists have tracked how often
voters registered with a political party
vote for that party’s candidates, but an

5
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of partisan behavior in this nation’s and
this state’s history, and they challenged
the notion that partisan behavior has
been especially problematic in recent
years. Former Governor Barbara Roberts also cautioned against undue nostalgia for the “good old days.” She cited
the example of her late husband Frank
Robert’s service in the Oregon House
in the late 1960s while in the minority
party. After challenging the Speaker
on an issue, he was penalized by not
getting appointed to a single interim
committee.

background check on their partisan credentials. Then-Senate Majority Leader
Kate Brown concurred that party labels
matter more now than they did in the
past.
Charles Beggs, a retired journalist who
covered the state capitol with the Associated Press for forty years, maintained that partisanship has been much
more intense during the last three or
four legislative sessions, with the more
extreme members of each party exerting
greater control and overshadowing the
centrists. Lobbyists Pat McCormick
and Dave Barrows also
believed that partisanship has become a greater
problem in recent sessions,
adding that moderates
who cooperate with the
opposing party risk falling
out of favor with their own
leadership. McCormick,
a lobbyist with Conkling,
Fiskum & McCormick, Inc.,
noted that moderates from
both major parties reached
across the aisle more in the
past, but now they would be ostracized
by the other members of their party for
doing so. Barrows, a lobbyist with Dave
Barrows & Associates, and regarded by
some as the “dean of the lobbying corps
in Oregon,” also recalled a time when
legislative leaders from both parties
worked together on major legislation,
including Oregon’s famed 1967 beach
bill, which he thought could not happen
in today’s political climate. Some of the
committee’s witnesses maintained that

Witnesses in the opposing camp felt
that politics in Oregon has become more
ideologically and rigidly divided in recent years, and they provided some telling examples. Jeff Merkley, a Democrat
and the House minority leader in the
2005 session and Speaker of the House
in the 2007 session, noted that when he
worked as an intern in Republican Senator Mark Hatfield’s office, he was never
asked his party affiliation. He doubted
anyone would be hired today without a
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candidates like Mark Hatfield, Wayne
Morse and Al Ullman could not be
elected in the current climate.

crats can be expected to present starkly
different visions for Oregon and to
compete vigorously for control of state
government.

Not all of the witnesses who believe
that partisanship has increased in
Oregon think that the increase is a sign
of dysfunction. Instead, they point to
changes in society and argue that a more
polarized public will naturally result in a
more polarized legislature. Tim Hibbitts
asserted that politics is more partisan
than it was thirty years ago. Hibbitts
offered the opinion that the Democratic
Party had become more liberal and the
Republican Party more conservative, not
as a result of the organized efforts of political parties, but because the public has
been drawn more and more to uncompromising ideologies. Governor Victor
Atiyeh added that “the main cause of
the problem [of excessive partisanship] is not the elected people, but the
people who elect them.” In short, a more
partisan legislature is a natural result of
a more partisan electorate.

Oregon has experienced major socioeconomic changes since the early 1970s
that have reinforced these ideological
differences. Oregon was once more
homogenous, economically and socially,
and until the late 1950s Republicans
were the majority in the Legislature.
(See Appendix E.) Through the 1970s
and 80s, Republicans and Democrats
were both elected from all parts of the
state. With the decline of the timber
industry in rural areas and the rise of
high-technology businesses in the Portland metropolitan area, Oregon today
is culturally and economically more
divided, with dramatic differences from
region to region.5 These local developments, some of which reflect national
trends, have exacerbated ideological differences between urban and rural areas.
Political analyst Bob Moore pointed to
this growing political segregation along
geographical lines as one of the most
dangerous trends in the nation — no
different than religious or racial segregation — and not healthy for the country.

Professor Clucas has described the two
major ideologies of the role of government in Oregon as progressivism and
conservative populism. In recent years
progressives have tended to cluster in
urban areas and vote for Democrats.
Conservative populists, by contrast, are
generally located in rural areas and vote
for Republicans. “[M]uch of Oregon’s
political conflict,” writes Clucas, “reflects
the collision of the progressives’ strong
support for an active government and
the conservative populists’ general
desire to limit government.”4 In this
environment, Republicans and Demo-

Several witnesses also pointed to national influences on the partisan climate
in Oregon. In her 2006 book, Fight Club
Politics: How Partisanship is Poisoning the
House of Representatives, Juliet Eilperin
provides evidence of institutionalized incivility at the federal level on
both sides of the aisle, including public
insults directed at both the opposing
side and non-conforming members of
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the same party. Barrows and Merkley
both attribute some of the excessive
partisanship witnessed in recent legislative sessions in Oregon to the strident
ideological views and aggressive political
tactics of former Congressmen Newt
Gingrich and Tom DeLay. Tony Van
Vliet, a Republican state representative from Corvallis from 1974 to 1994
concurred, as did former Republican
U.S. Senator Robert Packwood. Van Vliet
traced the change to the late 1980s and
early 1990s, when GOPAC, a national
political action committee led by thenCongressman Gingrich, embarked on
a nationwide campaign to build a Republican political infrastructure capable
of winning and maintaining control
of state and local governments across
the United States. Through campaign
seminars, workbooks, audiotapes and
grassroots organizing, GOPAC became
the Republican Party’s education and
training center. In particular, training tapes produced and distributed by
GOPAC galvanized Republican candidates and activists. GOPAC material
made clear that no member should cooperate with a Democrat. In Van Vliet’s
words, “If you talked to a Democrat, you
were a traitor.”

lawmaking.Your committee’s witnesses
unanimously expressed the view that
genuine deliberation and compromise is
an essential ingredient in the governing
process. Your committee could not agree
more. There are certainly times when
fidelity to one’s principles is honorable
and socially valuable. However, given
that Oregon’s legislators represent diverse economic and geographic regions,
thoughtful and respectful deliberation
is necessary to address the unique needs
of each district while compromising to
deliver what is best for the state as a
whole.
Your committee believes that when
the Legislature is perceived as an
acrimonious and dysfunctional body,
well-qualified potential candidates are
discouraged from running and serving, which in turn further erodes the
public’s respect for government. If the
public perceives that its elected officials
are motivated by partisanship at the
expense of the public’s best interests,
the resultant loss of confidence in state
government may encourage apathy or
circumvention of the legal process.
Your committee also agreed with the
conclusion of the PCOL that excessive
partisanship comes at “the expense of
collaboration and creative problem solving,” “erodes public faith in the Legislature and its ability to find reasonable
compromise,” and “discourages many
qualified candidates from running for
legislative office.”6 Excessive partisanship is a problem that warrants attention from all Oregonians.

While degrees of partisanship elude
precise measurement, the dominant
perception among the witnesses interviewed by your committee was that
excessive partisanship has increased
in Oregon over the past several decades. Your committee concluded that
excessive partisanship is a problem
in Oregon that has inhibited effective
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Areas for Reform

Chapter Conclusions

Based on the testimony of witnesses,
your committee identified two major
areas for reform: (1) legislative administration, rules and procedure, and
(2) the design of our election system.
In addition, because many witnesses
emphasized the importance of strong
relationships among legislators as a
counterbalance to partisanship, your
committee analyzes several ideas for
how to promote good working relationships in the Legislature. Finally, many
witnesses also mentioned the influence
of the public and the media on partisan
behavior in the Legislature, so your
committee discusses that issue in the
final chapter and considers whether any
reforms are possible.

➤➤ Partisanship serves to help develop
and clarify competing visions of
what is best for Oregon, and it
helps focus the activities of voters
and legislators from different parties.
➤➤ Excessive partisanship is widely
perceived as having increased over
the past several decades in Oregon.
➤➤ Excessive partisanship is a problem
in Oregon that should be addressed
because it impairs legislators’ ability to deliberate and collaborate
on legislation, results in legislative
gridlock, discourages qualified candidates from running for office and
leads to voter disaffection.

Before launching into a discussion
of the first major area for reform —
legislative administration, rules and
procedure — it is first necessary to lay
a foundation by describing the partisan
power structure. The following chapter
will explain the roles of state political
parties, legislative caucuses and interest
groups in developing partisan allegiance
among legislators.

9

City Club of Portland

STATE PARTIES, LEGISLATIVE
CAUCUSES AND INTEREST GROUPS
The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate President are
the presiding officers of the House and
Senate respectively. They are elected at
the beginning of the legislative session by the members of their assembly.
The Speaker of the House and Senate
President control the operations of the
Legislature by appointing members to
committees and selecting committee
chairs, assigning bills to committees and
setting agendas for legislative sessions.
The presiding officers also typically play
an important role in fundraising for
their party members.

Although Oregon’s Republican and
Democratic state parties work to advance partisan interests, these parties
are not the most powerful political
organizations in the state. Rather, the
legislative party caucuses, often highly
reliant upon special interest groups,
wield the greatest amount of partisan
power and influence in Oregon. The
picture that emerges is not so much of
a unified hierarchical structure as of
a coalition of groups that attempt to
coordinate with each other in the name
of the state party. In short, legislative
caucuses and interest groups frequently
fuel excessive partisanship in Oregon
more than do the parties themselves.

The members of the two major parties in
the House and the Senate are organized
into legislative caucuses: House and
Senate Democrats and House and Senate Republicans. The majority and minority caucuses in each house elect their
caucus leaders: House Majority Leader,
Senate Majority Leader, House Minority Leader and Senate Minority Leader.
Caucus leaders advance common goals
of party members in the Legislature and
strive to maintain or win majority con-

Before continuing, some definitions are
in order:
State parties are membership organizations that engage the public by registering voters, organizing volunteer efforts
in support of the party’s candidates in
general elections, and developing party
platforms.
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trol by leading caucus meetings during
legislative sessions, recruiting legislative
candidates, and raising and distributing
campaign funds.

ported by a small number of full-time
staff members. These administrative
organizations are so small that much
of the parties’ work is done through
volunteer efforts. In comparison to their
counterparts in other states, Oregon’s
major state parties are relatively small
administrative organizations with
limited influence. According to Amy
Langdon, past executive director of the
Oregon Republican Party, other similarsized states, such as Nevada, have party
offices with two-to-three times the staff.

Partisan interest groups are groups
that align with one party to promote
favored legislation and prevent passage
of disfavored legislation. They do so
by funding like-minded candidates in
primary and general elections, mobilizing volunteers, appealing to voters
during campaigns, and calling on party
members to adhere to the group’s policy
positions during legislative sessions.

The two major state parties are relatively independent of the county parties
and the national parties. Senator Peter
Courtney, President of the Senate since
2003, noted that some of the county
parties are even more active than the
state parties. The county party is controlled by representatives elected from
precincts. The county parties choose delegates to serve as their representatives
in the state party; the state parties, in
turn, choose delegates to serve as their
representatives in the national party.
The national parties do not control
the state parties, and the state parties
do not control the county parties. The
national parties may, however, exercise
influence over the state parties through
distribution of funds.

State Parties
As nearly all legislators in recent legislative sessions have belonged either to
the Republican or Democratic parties,
your committee has chosen to focus this
section of its report on the role that the
two major state parties play in promoting partisanship in the Oregon Legislature. Your committee learned that the
major state parties are basically small
administrative organizations with little
power and influence. They help register
voters, develop party platforms, and
organize volunteer efforts in support of
the party’s candidates for national and
executive-branch state office, but they
play little to no role in setting partisan
legislative agendas. Your committee has
concluded that their role in promoting
excessive partisanship in the Legislature
is negligible.

Each of the major state parties is
responsible for the development of
the party platform, but legislators are
in no way bound by these platforms.
Party platforms are debated and decided
upon by delegates. The state parties use
their platforms as a way of providing
information to the public about their

Both major state parties are led by
executive directors, who are in turn sup-
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positions on issues. But once adopted,
the platforms have little effect on candidates or legislators. Candidates running
on a state party’s ticket are not required
to agree with the party platform. In fact,
according to former Democratic House
Speaker Jeff Merkley, many legislators have never even read their state
parties’ platforms. Therefore, although
platform discussions often attract the
most devoted party members who may
put strong planks in the platform, those
party faithful are not likely to influence
the legislators through the platform
itself.

Despite their significant, but limited,
role in running candidates for statewide executive office and national office,
the state parties play negligible roles in
races for the Oregon Legislature. The
limited role of Oregon’s state parties in
legislative elections is further highlighted by the fact that state parties in
most other states wield considerable
authority when it comes to recruiting
candidates and supporting campaigns
for state legislative office. When it
comes to races for the Legislature, the
state parties in Oregon defer to partisan
legislative caucuses. Neel Pender, former
executive director of the Democratic
Party of Oregon, told your committee
that there existed a “healthy division of
labor” between the state party and the
partisan legislative caucus as to recruitment of candidates. Amy Langdon, who
was the executive director of the Republican Party of Oregon at the time of her
interview, noted that her party has been
in a period of restructuring so that the
legislative caucuses have taken on more
power, including recruitment.

The state’s major parties — often with
the financial assistance of the national
parties — recruit candidates for statewide executive-branch and national
offices and support these candidates in
the general election by getting information to voters, providing volunteers and
mailings for candidates, and registering
and mobilizing voters. But they do not
actually choose the parties’ candidates
for the general election. Rather, each
party’s candidates are determined in the
primary election, and anyone registered as a party member may vote in
the primary. Each state party generally
supports its incumbents in the primary,
although county parties have been
known to endorse candidates other than
incumbents. If there is no incumbent
and there is more than one candidate
for the party’s nomination, the state
party does not typically endorse one
candidate; but party members, even legislators themselves, can and do support
challengers in the primary.

Your committee concluded that the
Republican and Democratic state parties
in Oregon are grassroots organizations
that serve the valuable function of
recruiting candidates for office and involving citizens in the political process,
but that these state parties have little
direct influence over the Legislature.
Your committee also concluded that
none of the minority parties had attained sufficient impact to be considered
as contributing to or against excessive
partisanship in the Legislature. Finally,
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none of the witnesses your committee
interviewed put any blame for excessive
partisanship in the Legislature on the
state parties, and your committee did
not find it necessary to consider any
reforms directed at the state parties.

As discussed below, the President of
the Senate and the House Speaker have
substantial power over legislative proceedings and over the appointment of
legislators to committees. They appoint
committee chairs, who in turn have
considerable influence on committee
proceedings. The Speaker of the Oregon
Legislative Caucuses
House of Representatives in particular
has been identified as the fifth most
Legislative caucuses play a far greater
powerful state house speaker in the
role in promoting partisanship than the
country.7 This high ranking is primarily
state parties. Indeed, Senate President
due to the Oregon Speaker’s generous
Peter Courtney
power to appoint
noted that the state
“Legislative caucuses play a
party leaders and
parties fall into the
far greater role in promoting the chairs of standbackground when
partisanship than the state
ing committees, to
legislative sessions
parties.… [T]he state parties make committee
begin, at which
fall into the background
assignments, to retime the caucuses
when legislative sessions
structure the combecome very active
begin, at which time the
mittee system, to
caucuses become very active provide campaign
and exert substanand exert substantial power assistance and adtial power over
over party members.”
party members.
ditional staff, and
to control the legisThe party caulative calendar and
cuses consist of the
procedures,
in
addition
to the unlimited
members of a political party within the
number
of
years
he
or
she
may serve as
Legislature. Political affiliation provides
8
Speaker.
The
next
chapter
of this report
the organizing principle of legislative
will
discuss
the
powers
of
the
presiding
activity, including the election of presidofficers
in
more
detail.
At
this
point, it is
ing officers. In Oregon, the members
enough
to
note
that
the
powers
associof the party having the most seats in a
ated
with
these
positions
create
strong
particular house coordinate their votes
incentives for the legislative caucuses to
to select their presiding officers: the
strive for majority status and for legislaPresident of the Senate and the Speaker
tors in the majority party to be loyal to
of the House of Representatives. Shortly
their presiding officer.
thereafter, the four caucuses then elect
their caucus leaders: the House Majority
Leader, the House Minority Leader, the
Senate Majority Leader and the Senate
Minority Leader.

The roles of party caucus leaders are
not formally defined, but caucus leaders
nevertheless exert tremendous influence within the Legislature. According
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to Professor Clucas, “The main job of the
caucus leaders is to promote their party’s political and policy goals. Although
they are not the top leaders in the
state parties, the caucus leaders in the
majority party often play a more direct
role in planning strategy and championing party goals than the speaker or the
president.”9 One important role of a
caucus leader is building and maintaining majority control through the recruitment of candidates and fund-raising.
During legislative sessions, the caucus
leaders convene frequent meetings of
their members, in which they share
information, develop policy goals and
plan strategy. Caucus meetings have traditionally been conducted behind closed
doors, with some short-lived exceptions.
During caucus meetings, members often
educate their colleagues about bills
pending before their committees.

also serve as liaisons to state and federal
agencies to assist constituents.10
The strong pressure on individual
legislators to conform to legislative
priorities of their caucus is well recognized. Shortly after his 2006 election,
then-freshman Democrat Ben Cannon
was advised by a more senior legislator
that he should support decisions of the
Democratic caucus.11 Senator Charlie
Ringo, a Democrat from Beaverton,
also commented on the power of the
Democratic caucus leaders to dictate a
legislative agenda for its members.
Legislators will naturally be sensitive to how their legislative decisions
may be judged by their constituents in
the next election. Caucus leaders can
use the specter of defeat in the next
primary election to bring their members
into consensus on key issues for the
party. Dave Barrows described how an
outside campaign consultant managed
the agenda of the Republican caucus
during the 2005 session, insisting that
members “sing from this hymnal,” which
was perceived by some as coercive and
excessively partisan. Several witnesses
also pointed to the example of House
members Cheryl Walker and Vic Backlund, both Republicans, being targeted
in the primary because of disagreements
with their caucuses on budget and tax
issues.

Several witnesses noted that members
of the Legislature find caucus meetings
useful because they can discuss candidly
why their constituents are opposed to
party-backed measures. Legislators
are free to ask questions they would be
reluctant to ask on the floor. Legislative staff may also be present to provide
fiscal or legal background or to lay out
parliamentary options, but caucus
members typically dismiss nonpartisan
staff when discussing political strategy.
In addition to the political aspects of the
caucuses, the caucus offices also provide
support services to the members of the
Legislature, such as conducting research, writing speeches and preparing
press releases. The caucus offices may

In the 2007 session, the House Republican leadership effectively used
caucus meetings to “lock down” votes
against revenue bills that enjoyed, at
least initially, bipartisan support. House
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Republicans assembled the necessary
votes to block passage of bills to raise
the corporate minimum tax, to create
a dedicated tax for affordable housing,
and to raise the cigarette tax to fund
children’s health coverage. All of these
bills initially appeared to have enough
Republican support to pass, but after
a caucus meeting, the support disappeared.

and the fact that the leadership can use
the PAC, virtually unfettered, to ensure
continued leadership and to reward
loyal party members and punish disloyal
party members.

Interest Groups

While interest groups are an essential
component of a robust democracy, they
nonetheless play a significant role in
The principal power exerted by presiding
fueling excessive partisanship. They
officers and caucus leaders comes from
do so in a number of ways. Interest
their control over the distribution of
groups serve as a
campaign money.
principal source of
Special interests
“The principal power
funds for leadership
contribute money
exerted by presiding
PACs, they provide
to leadership PACs
officers and caucus leaders
funds to candidates
that are largely
comes from their control
who support their
controlled by the
over the distribution of
causes, and they
caucus leaders or
campaign money.… The
hire lobbyists to inpresiding officers.
leaders can reward loyal
fluence legislators.
party members with greater
Those officers then
contributions and refuse to
have the power to
Before discussing
assist candidates who are
divide the funds
in more detail how
perceived not to be toeing
among their parinterest groups
the party line.”
ties’ candidates.
often serve to
The leaders can
promote excessive
reward loyal party
partisanship, a few definitions relating
members with greater contributions
to interest groups are in order. An interand refuse to assist candidates who are
est group itself is an organized group of
perceived not to be toeing the party
people with common interest in some
line. The considerable financial power
particular political issue. There are at
of legislative leaders over potential
least two different types of interest
campaign funds is a tool that can be
groups. An interest group may represent
used in excessively partisan ways to
constituencies of people organized by
secure loyalty from party members in
occupation, like teachers or building
the Legislature. Your committee agreed
owners. An interest group may reprewith the concern expressed by Governor
sent people who share a similar value,
Barbara Roberts over the current power
like environmentalists or tax reformers.
of the caucuses and the leadership PACs,
Both types of interest groups may be

15

City Club of Portland

involved in advocating for or against
issues that are particularly divisive or
controversial and in ways that are not
susceptible to compromise. The more
interest there is among public members in the issues advanced by interest
groups, the more likely the group will be
able to accumulate the funds and influence that it may use to advance its goals
with legislators. These are fundamental
elements of democracy: constituents
telling their representatives what they
want through the medium of organized
interest groups.

themselves have neither the time nor
staff to research every policy issue that
comes before them. The most effective
lobbyists are those who have developed
a reputation for honesty, and lobbyists
who are not candid with legislators lose
the trust of those legislators.13 Interest
groups often do more than just talk to
legislators — they also make campaign
contributions and mobilize voters in
elections.
This report focuses on interest groups
that are aligned with one or the other
major political party, and your committee calls them “partisan interest groups.”
Your committee distinguishes those
groups from interest groups that donate
money to both Republican and Democratic candidates even-handedly in order
to gain access to whichever candidate
is elected. Partisan interest groups that
consistently support only Democratic
candidates or only Republican candidates function essentially as extensions
of the parties. They may provide support
not just through campaign donations
but also by mobilizing their members
to vote for the party’s candidate and, in
some cases, even campaigning directly
for the candidate.

Many interest groups hire lobbyists to
serve this function. More than 300 hundred groups have registered lobbyists at
the state capitol. Oregon ranks twentysecond in the nation for the number of
entities that use lobbyists. The number
of lobbyists working in the state capitol
also seems to be growing. The association of Oregon lobbyists, known as the
Capitol Club, listed 385 members in
2001 — a considerable increase from
300 in 1991.12 Many political watchers
are uncomfortable with this apparent
increase in the number of lobbyists
working on behalf of interest groups in
the state capitol. At the same time, as
one observer said, one cannot bemoan
the rise of interest groups if one favors
greater civic engagement on the part of
the public.

Partisan interest groups generally
include those with large, or very wellfunded, constituencies and those with
an ideological focus. Some examples on
the Democratic side are public employee
and other labor unions, environmentalists and pro-choice supporters. On the
Republican side are social conservatives,
some business interests, anti-tax groups
and pro-life supporters. This does not

Interest groups and their lobbyists
play a number of different roles with
regard to the Legislature. Lobbyists
often make a positive contribution
to the Legislature because they study
policy issues and inform legislators who
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mean, for example, that there are no
Democrats who are pro-life and no Republicans who are pro-choice. However,
Republican and Democratic legislators
tend to align with particular groups,
which in turn support them with money
and volunteers.

ceive that the incumbent has not been
faithful to the special interest group’s
needs. Two of Oregon’s larger labor
unions — the SEIU and the Oregon
Education Association — together gave
over $350,000 to Representative Greg
MacPherson’s opponent, John Kroger,
in the 2008 Democratic primary race for
Oregon’s attorney general. This dollar
figure amounted to almost half of the
total funds that now-Attorney General
Kroger raised for the primary campaign.
Many political observers speculated
that these unions gave this significant
amount of money to Mr. Kroger as “payback” for Representative MacPherson’s
role in drafting and promoting legislation in 2003 that changed the public
employees’ retirement system and cut
public employee benefits. The unions
had adamantly opposed this legislative
effort.

Partisan interest groups have significant
influence and impact. Almost half of
those interviewed expressed the view
that partisan interest groups controlled
party agendas and that interest groups
were more powerful than state parties. Interest groups, they argued, play
a strong role in promoting excessive
partisanship in the Legislature. The concern that contributions from interested
parties may taint a legislator’s judgment
is reflected in the fact that there are
stringent reporting requirements for
all legislators who receive contributions
during the legislative session.14

Second, partisan interest groups tend to
characterize issues in a black-and-white,
good-versus-evil manner, thus encouraging ideological rigidity and making
it difficult for legislators of opposing
parties to talk about controversial issues
productively. When partisan interests
demand a specific legislative result,
which they often do, they may tolerate no compromise by their allies in
the Legislature. The resulting legislative discussion focuses not on finding
a reasonable solution but on achieving
a specific and pre-approved result. For
a legislator to participate in an open
or exploratory dialogue regarding the
issues affecting partisan interests suggests that compromise is possible and

Your committee concluded that partisan
interest groups interfere with deliberation and compromise between legislators of opposite parties in two principal
ways:
First, as will be discussed in more
detail in the chapter on campaigns and
elections, since aspiring legislators
must run for election first in a partisan
primary, they are hard put to suggest
compromises that displease their party’s
base. Interest groups play a key role in
primary elections, potentially providing
both financial and volunteer resources.
In addition, interest groups can recruit
and support challengers to incumbents
in the primary where the groups per-
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thus sends a worrisome signal to the
concerned partisan interests. Political
discourse in these situations is therefore
reduced to well-worn sound bites, with
the goal of pushing a partisan agenda
rather than engaging in the process of
finding a solution. The result is a situation in which each side sees the legislative process as an “all-or-nothing” effort,
with victory possible only through the
absolute defeat of one’s opponents. The
polarization can then extend to less
controversial issues, as legislators who
see each other as “the enemy” lose the
ability or interest to work together.

➤➤ Legislative caucus leaders and presiding officers possess more power
than state parties when it comes to
pressuring legislators to support
partisan agendas.
➤➤ Strong interest groups aligned with
either the Democrats or the Republicans often reinforce excessive
partisanship by pressuring legislators to commit to uncompromising
agendas.

Your committee concluded that partisan
interest groups often reinforce excessive partisanship. The legislative process
attracts partisan interest groups that
push their individual and sometimes
uncompromising agendas. Industry
groups, labor unions, religious conservatives and other interest groups use their
issues to energize their constituents and
apply pressure on individual legislative
members. These interest groups can
sway legislators because there may be
a high political cost for rejecting their
uncompromising positions.

Chapter Conclusions
➤➤ Oregon’s Republican and Democratic state parties are grassroots
organizations that serve the valuable function of involving citizens
in the political process, but they
have little involvement in the Legislature.
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LEGISLATIVE RULES, LEADERSHIP
AND NONPARTISAN STAFF
Anyone can be tempted to abuse power
movement of legislation. This form of
for partisan advantage, and many witexcessive partisanship rewards the connesses explained that Oregon’s legislasolidation of party power rather than
tive leaders have frequently succumbed
meaningful deliberative processes.
to this temptation. The temptation
Your committee concluded that two
stems primarily from the nature of
particularly clear manifestations of
the legislative rules that govern the
excessive partisanship are apparent in
legislative process. In contrast to some
the Legislature.
other states, where
First, the majority
legislative rules are
“Leaders of both parties
has the power to
defined in statutes,
– while they enjoy their
use the rules to remost rules that
majority status – have
regulate Oregon’s
regularly chosen to interpret duce the minority’s
legislative process
legislative rules in their own involvement in the
legislative process.
can be modified by
favor or to modify them
This is excessive
simple-majority
through simple-majority
partisanship in
vote of the House or vote in order to consolidate
its clearest form.
the Senate. Leadpower and to exert partisan
ers of both parSecond, the powers
control over committee
ties — while they
that come with the
assignments and the
movement of legislation.”
enjoy their majorleadership offices
ity status — have
in the Legislature
regularly chosen to
reinforce the inceninterpret legislative rules in their own
tive for each party to seek and mainfavor or to modify them through simpletain majority status. Your committee
majority vote in order to consolidate
examined these two manifestations of
power and to exert partisan control
partisanship and considered legislative
over committee assignments and the
rule changes that might at least dispel
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the temptation for the majority to abuse
its power at the expense of the minority.

determines the number of committees,
selects the committee chairs, appoints
members to committees and assigns
bills to committees for consideration.
As Oregon’s Legislature has a strong
committee system compared to other
legislatures, this system ensures that
presiding officers will have extraordinary authority over the legislative
process.

Background
As stated earlier in this report, in Oregon, the members of a particular house
choose the presiding officer of that
house: the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The majority and minority party
members meet in caucus to coordinate
their votes for the leaders. The majority
party members can also change their
leaders if they are displeased with their
performance. For example, at the beginning of the 1999 session, the Republican
caucus removed the sitting Speaker,
Lynn Lundquist, because he had been
too supportive of Democratic legislation.15

The bulk of legislative work occurs in
committees. In either the House or
the Senate, the committee chair may
schedule meetings on bills, and a majority of committee members may make
a formal request for a work session or
hearing on a bill to the committee chair.
Bills may be reported out of committee
either with or without minority reports,
and the rules provide a means for
amendments to be made. Bills reported
out of committee ultimately go to the
floor for a vote.

The President and the Speaker enjoy
tremendous discretionary power and
typically demand that their party
members support them 100 percent of
the time on procedural
votes. Therefore, these
leaders have considerable
discretion to change the
rules to strengthen their
control. As mentioned
above, changing the rules
of the legislative bodies
requires only a simplemajority vote.

Powers granted by the rules and options
for the presiding officers to use these

The most important
powers of the presiding
officers relate to committees. The presiding officer

20

Bridging the Partisan Divide

powers can vary between the House
and the Senate. Many witnesses were
of the opinion that the Speaker wielded
too much power over the agenda in the
House in 2005, particularly in regard to
committee appointments and the routing of bills to those committees. However, according to Representative Sal
Esquivel, then-Speaker Minnis’ efforts
to incorporate members of the minority
were not appreciated in her first session
as Speaker of the House; when she tried
to appoint Democrats to subcommittee
chairs, the Democratic leadership would
not cooperate. Some witnesses also
acknowledged that more control might
be appropriate in the House because
of important differences between the
House and Senate. Judy Hall, Secretary
of the Senate, quoted Senate President
Peter Courtney’s characterization of
the House as a “barroom brawl” and the
Senate as a “church.” Because it is twice
as large, the House is more difficult to
organize; greater efforts are required to
move the agenda forward. Since Senators serve longer terms, and many have
had experience as representatives in the
House, the Senate requires less organization because of the greater experience
of its members and stronger relationships among them.

Other witnesses, however, argued that
a strong presiding officer system makes
it too easy to exclude the minority from
any meaningful participation, and noted
that there will always be partisan pressures to do exactly that.
Members of the minority have some
limited rights even in the face of the
majority’s determination to exclude minority participation. Minority members
have the right to debate any measure
on the floor. They also have the power
to propose amendments in committee.
In addition, if they do not support a bill
that has been approved by the committee and sent to the floor for a vote,
they may file a minority report to be
considered on the floor along with the
approved bill. Often minority reports
are filed to make a political statement or
to force the majority party members to
take a position on an issue, but sometimes minority reports gain serious consideration and even pass. However, these
minority rights, which are conferred
only through legislative rules, can be
changed by a simple-majority vote of the
legislative house. For example, at the beginning of the 2008 special session, the
Democratic majority adopted rules on a
party-line vote that prohibited the filing
of minority reports unless a majority of
House members signed on to the report.
Republican lawmakers argued that such
a rule essentially eliminated their right
to have alternative legislation considered
on the House floor.

Some witnesses spoke in favor of strong
leader control in both houses, arguing
that it is inefficient to do everything
by committee in a citizen legislature.
Those witnesses placed great reliance
on the character and leadership skills
of the presiding officers and reasoned
that poor leaders would be voted out.

The minority generally does not possess
the right to force consideration of a bill,
either in committee or on the floor. This
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right belongs exclusively to the majorsessions, when party control was split
ity. The Legislature traditionally has
between the two houses, House and
maintained rules allowing a majority of
Senate leaders were forced to work
legislators, from either party, to call for
together in order to pass a budget and
a vote on a bill without the agreement of
other priority legislation. On the other
the presiding officer. In the House this
hand, some witnesses reported that the
rule is called the “Rule of 31,” because 31
presiding officers at times would refuse
votes constitute a majority. At the very
to consider legislation passed by the
end of the 2005 legislative session, howother assembly — even bills that would
ever, this rule was changed so that only
have been supported by a majority of
the presiding officer could bring a bill
members — a practice that will be disto the floor for a vote. The Democratic
cussed in more detail below.
members of the
Your committee
House, who were in
“Rules that guarantee
concluded that
the minority at the
meaningful participation for
legislative rules
time, opposed the
members of the minority
and procedures
measure and argued party should be in place.”
have been misused
that the purpose
by leadership of
for the rule change
both
parties
for
excessively
partisan
was to prevent the House from debating
purposes,
that
the
powers
of
majority
and voting on the Senate-passed civil
control are so great that party leaders
unions bill. Then-Speaker Minnis disbecome overly focused on maintaining
agreed, stating that the reason for the
or achieving power in the next election,
change was to prevent House members
and that this focus interferes with the
from wasting time by bringing bills to
cooperation and compromise often necthe floor that had little or no chance of
essary for good public policy. Rules that
passage simply for political purposes.
guarantee meaningful participation for
At the beginning of the 2007 session,
members of the minority party should
the House voted to restore the Rule of
be in place. Your committee found the
31. Six bills were pulled from commitmost partisan legislative maneuvering
tee and considered on the House floor
in two areas: committee assignments
pursuant to this rule during the 2007
and the assignment of particular bills
session.
to committees. Rules that restore more
The power of the leadership to control
rationality and less gamesmanship to
the agenda is complicated when differcommittee assignments and that limit
ent parties control the Senate and the
some of leadership’s power over assignHouse. This situation can lead either
ment of bills to committees could help
to bipartisan cooperation or partisan
to alleviate the excessively partisan
stalemate, with each house rejecting
atmosphere. Your committee also found,
bills passed by the other house. Several
as discussed further below, that having
professional nonpartisan staff serving
witnesses noted that during recent
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the legislative body contributes to an
environment where greater collaboration is likely to occur.

incorporating all rules into statutes. The
concern was that if rules were made into
statutes, the Governor could veto subsequent legislation designed to change
a rule, raising legitimate questions of
separation of powers.

The PCOL noted many of the same
concerns, concluding that “some rules
and practices of the Legislature promote
excessive partisanship and prevent
problems from being addressed efficiently and effectively.” The PCOL urged
that the rules of the House and Senate
not be used to prevent consideration of
significant policy issues and exhorted
presiding officers to represent the body
as a whole and not to use their authority
to prevent debate on policy matters. It
also encouraged majority and minority
leaders to develop a more collaborative
environment for discussing legislative
priorities and establish collaborative
processes that include the minority in
session management. (See Appendix D.)

Your committee thus reached a compromise recommendation: the Legislature
should incorporate into statute certain
language relating to how rules would
be created, changed (e.g. by simple or
super-majority vote) or superseded.
Your committee also decided that rules
protecting the minority’s rights of
participation should require a supermajority to change.

Control of Committee
Assignments
As has been noted, Oregon’s legislative
presiding officers have discretionary
power over all committee assignments.
A key assignment is the position of
committee chair. Committee chairs
have considerable authority to adopt
procedural rules and decide which
proposed bills will be considered by the
committee. In Oregon’s strong committee system, the chairs direct much
of the legislative process. Although
the House Speaker and Senate President do not directly control committee
process, committee chairs serve at the
pleasure of the presiding officers. Also,
the presiding officers decide which bills
to assign to which committees, giving
them considerable influence over the
flow of legislation.

Your committee considered the best
manner to implement legislative rules
that might in turn foster such a collaborative environment and process. The
current manner of legislative rule-making is clearly flawed, as it is possible for
the Legislature to make changes to the
rules with very little deliberation and by
mere simple-majority vote.
One alternative — transforming all
rules into statutes — also has its
drawbacks. While there are numerous legislative processes incorporated
into statute,* your committee and
witnesses were resistant to the idea of
* For example, ORS 171.555 creates the
Joint Ways and Means Committee, sets out the
means for establishing the committee’s membership, and identifies many of the procedures
for the committee.
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Oregon’s committee assignment process
seven House Republicans and only three
differs from the process in the U.S. ConHouse Democrats to the Joint Ways and
gress in a way that gives presiding ofMeans Committee and six House Repubficers in the state Legislature far greater
licans and only two House Democrats to
power. In the U.S. Congress all legislathe Emergency Board.16
tors, including members of the minority,
Besides resulting in a loss of proporonce appointed to a particular standing
tional party equity on committees, such
committee, have a proprietary right to
arbitrary committee assignments fretheir committee positions and can move
quently rob committees, and ultimately
up the ranks through seniority. No such
the Legislature itself, of considerable
right exists in the Oregon Legislature,
expertise. Several witnesses complained
where presiding officers have near
that when the
complete authorpresiding officers
ity over committee
“[I]n the Oregon Legislature,
assignments. As a
assign minority
where presiding officers have
result, the Oregon
committee memnear complete authority over
system can lead to
bers, legislators
committee assignments. As
a loss of expertise
with special expea result, the Oregon system
on committees
rience, education,
can lead to a loss of expertise
if someone or
or professional
on committees if someone
some party falls
training are not asor some party falls out of
out of favor and
signed to commitfavor and the experienced
the experienced
tees in which their
members of the committee
members of the
knowledge would
are reassigned.”
committee are
be valuable. Thenreassigned. In the
Senator Westlund
2005 session in the House, the Speaker
noted, for example, that Representative
made all committee assignments, usuAlan Bates, a Democrat from Ashland
ally without conferring with minority
and a physician with the expertise and
leadership. A more equitable state of
the desire to work on health policy, was
affairs existed in the Senate, where the
not assigned to the committee that
President consulted the minority leaderdealt with health matters while he was
ship about committee appointments
in the minority party.
and ensured that all appointments,
including those to the important Ways
The House Speaker has not always made
and Means Committee and the Emercommittee appointments unilaterally.
gency Board, were proportional. In the
Sal Esquivel noted that when Hardy
House, by contrast, committee comMyers served as Speaker of the House
position was not always proportional.
from 1979 to 1983, he established rules
For example, during the 2005 session,
that committee membership would
when the House had 34 Republicans
be proportional and that the party
and 26 Democrats, the Speaker assigned
members would select the specific com-
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mittee members so that the Speaker
would have no role in choosing minority
members of committees. In the past,
the minority party also had the right to
name vice-chairs of committees. Former
Speaker Vera Katz, however, altered
the committee assignment process in a
way that exhibited excessive partisanship. When she presided as Speaker, she
personally made all committee assignments, even for the minority party. The
change benefited the Democrats for the
two sessions Katz served as Speaker,
but then gave Republicans the same
advantage when they took majority
control of the House. This example illustrates how the manipulation of power
by the majority party often leads to the
same manipulation when the minority
becomes the majority.

Your committee concluded that committee assignments have increasingly
become political tools that both parties
have used to their advantage. Because
the committee structure is so critical to
the legislative process, the manipulation of the rules surrounding committee assignments for political purposes
has heightened the sense of excessive
partisanship in the Legislature and
discouraged bipartisan cooperation.
Restoring the prior rules on committee
assignments could help alleviate these
problems. Members of the minority
should be given the opportunity to
contribute in a meaningful way to deliberating legislation. The House in 2007
took a significant step in this direction
by restoring the rule that all committee
appointments must be made proportionally. Your committee recommends
that legislative rules in both houses be
amended to require proportional representation of party members on committees, as the rules of the House presently
require. Your committee also agrees
with the PCOL’s specific recommendation that the Legislature adopt rules to
“empower leadership of the minority
party to select minority representatives on legislative committees” and to
“require that Vice-Chairs of legislative
committees be from minority parties.”
(See Appendix D.) Finally, your committee recommends that the legislative
leadership take into account experience,
interest, and seniority in determining
committee assignments.

As legislative processes are inherently
partisan, finding a way to meld partisan
maneuvering with the obligations of effective lawmaking will always be a challenge. A minority party, for example,
may be best served politically by being
perceived as having little say in legislation that the minority does not support
and believes is not in its best political
interests. By contrast, a process that
allows the minority party to have some
influence creates real opportunities for
meaningful contribution to legislation.
Your committee believes that active and
constructive participation is a responsibility of elected office. In the balance
between political posturing and effective legislative process, your committee
found value in having majority and minority members constructively engaged
in the work of committees.
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Control of Legislation

been a shift of power from committees
to caucuses. At one time, “you would
Besides deciding the number, membergo before a committee and feel that if
ship and leadership of committees, the
convinced, the committee could get the
presiding officers also have considerable
bill through, thus it was worth spending
power over the movement of bills into
time testifying and educating them.”
and out of committee. First, the presidTroy Nichols, chief of staff to Speaker
ing officer appoints the members of the
Minnis during the 2005 session, linked
committees as well as the chairs and
the rise in caucus activity to the period
vice-chairs. Second, although the rules
of term limits. Recently, the unspoof each legislative body require that the
ken rule has been that a bill must have
presiding officer refer each bill or meathe support of the majority of the masure to a committee
jority caucus before
within seven days
“[T]he
authority
of
presiding
it can come to the
of its first readofficers
can
be
used
in
floor. Wyse cited
ing, the presiding
excessively partisan ways
his own experience
officers are free to
to prevent bills sponsored
with the sunset
decide to which
by members of the minority
renewal of the
committee the bills
party from being passed or
Oregon Progress
or measures will
even debated.”
Board, which passed
be assigned. Third,
out of committee
subject to a majorunanimously but did not get to the floor
ity of the committee’s request that a bill
or measure be acted upon, the presiding
because it did not have the support of
officers can pressure committee chairs
the majority of the Republican caucus.
to give hearings to, or bring to the floor,
He noted that the effect of caucus decithe bills favored by the leadership.
sion on bills meant that a minority of
Finally, the President of the Senate is
the body — a majority of the majority
an ex-officio member of each commitcaucus, which could amount to only 26
tee with the right to vote. Clearly, the
percent of the legislators — has disauthority of presiding officers can be
proportionate power. As noted above,
used in excessively partisan ways to
the reinstitution of the Rule of 31 in
prevent bills sponsored by members of
the House should alleviate some of the
the minority party from being passed or
problems noted by Wyse and others.
even debated.
The PCOL recommended that the
Legislature adopt rules to allow measures with demonstrable evidence of a
majority of members of the chamber in
support to move to the floor for debate
and vote. (See Appendix D.)

Caucuses also have considerable sway
over the committee process. Duncan
Wyse, who has worked with the Legislature as president of the Oregon Business
Council since 1995, noted that, over
the last ten to fifteen years, there has
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Following the release of the PCOL report in 2006, Republican Representative
Sal Esquivel and Democratic Representative Peter Buckley drafted rules that
were adopted by the Oregon House of
Representatives as the “Teamwork Bill.”
The new rules entitle each House member to have a hearing and work session
for two bills so long as the member can
obtain two chief co-sponsors from each
party.17 Seven bills were designated as
teamwork bills during the 2007 session.

on a bill. Third, the House and Senate
should adopt and maintain rules permitting a substantial minority of each of
their members to require a committee
or floor hearing on a bill that has already
been passed by the other chamber.

Nonpartisan Staff

Presiding officers, committee chairs
and majority caucuses also exert power
over legislative processes through their
control of staff
Your committee
“Staff
have
a
duty
to
resources. The
agreed with the
serve
all
legislators,
but
most important
analysis underlycommittee staff report to
staff positions are
ing the PCOL’s
the committee chair. As
the Secretary of
recommendation
a result, minority party
the Senate and the
— that the strong
members sometimes have
control exercised
Chief Clerk of the
difficulties getting staff
by leadership over
House. They keep
support and are hampered
legislation prevents
official records,
in their ability to craft
important policy
advise the presiding
legislation for committee
issues from being
officers and memconsideration.”
aired and obstructs
bers on parliamenpassage of good
tary procedure, and
laws that would
oversee a number of employees. Both of
be widely supported. Your committee
these positions are elected by a majoralso applauds the House for passing
ity of votes from each chamber. The two
the Teamwork Bill. Your committee
current officers have both been in place
proposes additional specific recommenfor several sessions. While they each
dations to provide a check on the leaderserve all the members of their chamber,
ship’s power. First, the House and the
they work most closely with the presidSenate should adopt and maintain rules
ing officers.
allowing each member of the Legislature
to require a committee hearing on a preIn the 2005 Session Speaker Karen Mindetermined and limited number of bills
nis proposed a rule change that would
each legislative session. Second, the Senhave given the Speaker the sole power
ate should follow the House’s lead and
to hire and fire the Chief Clerk, but
adopt and maintain rules, similar to the
she faced resistance from the majorRule of 31, which permit a majority of
ity caucus. A modified rule change was
members, regardless of party affiliation,
adopted, giving the Speaker the power
to require a committee or floor hearing
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Chapter Conclusions

to terminate the Chief Clerk but requiring the full chamber to elect a successor.
This event highlighted the tension between serving the entire legislative body
and serving the majority leadership. In
2007 the House restored the rule which
places the right to hire or terminate the
Chief Clerk with the membership of the
House and not just the Speaker.

➤➤ Because of the structure of Oregon’s
Legislature, which is characterized by a strong-leader system, the
leaders have tremendous discretion
and set the tone for partisanship or
collaboration.
➤➤ As most of Oregon’s legislative rules
are subject to revision by simplemajority vote, they can be — and
have been — easily manipulated to
satisfy the immediate demands of
the majority party in a particular
house.

Committee members depend on the
policy work of staff members who
provide analysis for committees. Staff
have a duty to serve all legislators, but
committee staff report to the committee
chair. As a result, minority party members sometimes have difficulties getting
staff support and are hampered in their
ability to craft legislation for committee
consideration. The PCOL recommended
that the Legislature professionalize
issue-area staff to make them more accessible to all members. (See Appendix
D.)

➤➤ Oregon’s legislative rules grant its
presiding officers generous powers
that they can easily use to control
both committee assignments and
the movement of legislation in a
way that demands loyalty from
majority party members and that
excludes members of the minority
party from a meaningful role in the
legislative process.

Your committee found that staff resources are unreasonably and unevenly
distributed between the majority and
minority parties and, therefore, their
ability to analyze and propose meaningful legislation varies accordingly. Your
committee agrees with the PCOL and
recommends that administrative officers
and committee staff in the Legislature
be nonpartisan professionals serving
members of both parties; they should
not serve at the sole discretion of the
majority party.

➤➤ The strong leader system fosters
excessive partisanship by rewarding a winner-take-all approach to
controlling the Senate and House of
Representatives.
➤➤ Ostensibly nonpartisan administrative staff officers are subject to the
imperatives of the party in control
of a particular house.
➤➤ While committees remain important in the Legislature, their power
has somewhat diminished because
of the increasing power of the
caucuses.
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Chapter
Recommendations

that has already been passed by the
other chamber.
➤➤ The House should maintain and the
Senate should adopt rules ensuring
that the Secretary of the Senate
and the Chief Clerk of the House
are nonpartisan and serve members
of both parties, and not serve at
the sole discretion of the presiding
officers. In addition, the House and
Senate should employ permanent
staff with knowledge of substantive
policy areas to support the work of
committees.

➤➤ The House and Senate should adopt
and maintain rules that establish
proportional representation of
party members on committees and
permit the leaders of each caucus to
determine which of its members to
appoint to committees. When making committee assignments, caucus
leaders should take into account
the experience, interest and seniority of legislators.
➤➤ The House and Senate should adopt
and maintain rules that require the
vice-chair of each committee to be a
member of the minority party, and
committee chairs should consult
with vice-chairs in developing committee agendas.

➤➤ Once the above rules are adopted,
the House and Senate should
require a supermajority to change
these and other rules that protect
each member’s right to participate
in the legislative process.

➤➤ While the House’s Teamwork Bill
is a step in the right direction, the
House and Senate should adopt
and maintain rules that allow
each member of the Legislature to
require a committee hearing on a
predetermined number of bills during each legislative session.
➤➤ The House should maintain and the
Senate should adopt rules permitting a majority of each of their
members to require a committee or
floor hearing on a bill. In addition,
the House and Senate should adopt
and maintain rules permitting a
substantial minority of each of
their members to require a committee or floor hearing on a bill
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LEGISLATOR RELATIONSHIPS
AND CIVILITY
The Importance of
Relationships and Civility in
Legislative Deliberation

the Senate. In addition, senators are less
likely to be excessively partisan than
representatives because senators are
elected from larger districts and must
therefore appeal to a greater variety of
people.

The Oregon Legislature works best when
individual legislators have personal
and respectful relationships with each
other. A number of witnesses testified
that they believe those legislators who
know each other well and who respect
one another are more likely to work
together courteously and effectively.
Similarly, witnesses expressed the
opinion, and your committee concurred,
that courtesy and good relationships between legislators contribute to positive
deliberation.

There are instructive examples of how
legislators, particularly those from the
same geographic area, have been able to
put aside partisan concerns to work for
the common good of constituents. Representative Sal Esquivel, a self-described
“moderate Republican,” commented that
he and Representative Peter Buckley, a
Democrat, were able to develop strategies for working together to promote
common interests. Esquivel and Buckley, for example, drafted rules that were
later adopted to ensure that each House
member is able to bring forth at least
two bills and have those bills debated
in committee, regardless which party
is in power, so long as each bill has two
sponsors from each party, as discussed
previously.

Witnesses suggested that the Senate
generally fosters better relationships
between individual legislators than the
House for the reasons also discussed in
the previous chapter. Because the Senate is smaller and senators serve longer
terms, they tend to get to know each
other better. Senators also typically possess more experience, as many of them
served in the House before coming to

A number of witnesses commented that
the governor has an important part to
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play in alleviating excessive partisanship. Witnesses commented on the
styles of recent governors and noted
that some styles may be more effective
than others in mitigating the negative
consequences of partisanship. Lobbyist Dave Barrows pointed to Governor
Neil Goldschmidt as an example of a
governor who played a useful role in
combating excessive partisanship. Although he lacked legislative experience
prior to becoming governor, he quickly
learned the importance of consulting
the legislative leadership soon after calling a special session without having had
such a consultation. After that experience, Governor Goldschmidt made a
practice of casually visiting legislators
in their offices, regardless of their party
affiliation, in order to get to know them
personally. His close relationships with
these legislators eventually worked to
help facilitate passage of legislation that
he supported.

his list of priorities, as well as played a
key role in brokering compromises when
needed.”

The Experiment with Term
Limits
Witnesses pointed to the imposition of
term limits in 1992 as a factor that has
prevented many legislators from developing lasting and positive relationships.
Oregon voters approved legislative term
limits in 1992. The Oregon Supreme
Court later ruled in 2002 that the ballot
measure establishing term limits was
unconstitutional in the way it was drafted.18 Although term limits have been
abolished now for several years, many
witnesses felt that their negative effects
carried over into recent sessions.
Without exception, all witnesses who
commented on term limits agreed that
the period of term limits contributed to
excessive partisanship. The imposition
of limits meant that the most experienced legislators in the House served a
mere four years. Sal Esquivel, a Republican member of the House who represents the Medford area, pointed out
that term limits led to a dramatic loss of
institutional memory among legislators.
This loss of institutional memory meant
that inevitably inexperienced legislators were forced to rely heavily on party
caucuses and lobbyists for information
about policy matters and legislative
process. As a result, legislators were less
able to develop well-founded and independent proposals on various subjects.

Former legislative staffer and current
member of the lobby, Pat McCormick,
considered Republican Governor Victor
Atiyeh the best governor with whom he
had ever worked, in large part because
the governor met weekly with the majority and minority leadership of both
houses and maintained an open door
to any legislator who wished to discuss
matters with him.
Several observers noted favorably that
Governor Kulongoski made a greater
effort to build relationships across party
lines during the 2007 session than in
the 2005 session. One lobby newsletter
noted that he “weighed in judiciously on

Furthermore, because legislators were
less familiar with legislative processes,
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they often tried to force proposals
through the Legislature in a way that
merely produced gridlock. Mark Simmons, the Republican Speaker of the
House in 2001, concurred with Esquivel.
Although he said he voted for the limits
in 1992, he was glad when Oregon
courts ruled them unconstitutional a
decade later: “I saw that term limits take
power from the elected legislators and
give it to the lobby and the bureaucrats
— the people in the building with all the
experience.”19 Simmons added that term
limits also prevented legislators from
gaining the experience often required
for genuine leadership. “Under term
limits,” noted Simmons, “nobody can be
really ready to be Speaker.”

as opposed to a professional legislature,
can cope with the intricacies and growth
of the state budget and with the increasing length of the sessions.

The Deterioration of
Relationships among
Legislators
Many witnesses voiced the opinion that
there has been an unraveling of personal
relationships in the Legislature, which
has affected the Legislature’s ability to
deliberate on major issues. Witnesses
identified a number of contributing factors in addition to term limits, some of
which were discussed in the first part of
this report: uncompromising ideologies
that have become more widespread both
in the public and among politicians; the
influence of a national political culture
that brands members of the opposing party as enemies; and sociological
changes in Oregon that have created a
divide between urban and rural populations. Additional societal factors were
also mentioned, including a general
decline in civility and greater diversity
in the people who serve as legislators.

Oregon’s Citizen Legislature
Some witnesses pointed to the very existence of Oregon’s “citizen legislature”
itself as an engine of excessive partisanship. In a “citizen legislature,” legislators
convene for a few months every year
or two and are expected to keep their
outside jobs and support themselves
primarily from outside income. By
contrast, in a professional legislature,
legislators are paid a salary to work
year-round and are expected to give up
outside jobs when elected. Even setting
aside the effects of term limits, many
witnesses claimed that there are too
many “amateurs” in Oregon’s Legislature who are overly reliant on lobbyists
and special interests. Pointing out the
enormous and expanding responsibilities of the Legislature, they questioned
whether the state’s citizen Legislature,

Some witnesses pointed to the changing lifestyles of legislators, with more
of them interested in being at home
with their families than socializing
with fellow legislators. Former Senator
Mike Thorne noted: “I can recall getting
together in the evening with people I
had gone head-to-head with that day.
The next day we might be together on
another subject.” Since legislators tend
to socialize less during the session now,
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understand each other and their differing points of view.” Eilperin quotes
U.S. Representative Barney Frank as
commenting that even the tables in the
lunchroom are divided by party.20
Numerous witnesses argued that negative campaigns make it hard for legislators to form relationships with members of the opposite party once they get
into office. Other witnesses noted that
normal tensions arising from campaigning are exacerbated by the intensity, frequency and duration of campaigns. One
witness pointed out that members of
the House are almost always campaigning because they have only two-year
terms, thereby constantly stoking the
fires of excessive partisanship.

they rarely develop the same level of respect and understanding that members
shared in the past. Several witnesses
even pointed to changes in the physical
structure of the Capitol in Salem as having adversely impacted the development
of strong personal relationships among
legislators. Before the addition of the
Capitol wings, legislators did not have
separate offices, but worked from their
desks on the House and Senate floors
where they constantly interacted. In the
new wings, legislators are isolated in
their own offices and much less interaction occurs across party lines. Political
writer Juliet Eilperin notes the same
trend in Congress where fewer House
members move their families to Washington, D.C., instead spending as short
a week as possible in the capitol and
returning home for extended weekends,
a trend which she suggests has “made
it more difficult for House members to

There were also examples of caucus
leaders discouraging efforts to build
relationships between Democrats and
Republicans in the Oregon Legislature.
A few years ago, a number of freshman legislators developed a bipartisan
freshman caucus after attending a presession conference together. Their intention was to work together to develop
positive relationships and gain valuable
expertise. The legislative leadership,
however, strongly disapproved of this
caucus. When the staff tried to repeat
the conference for freshman legislators
before the next session, the leadership
quashed the idea.
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Your committee concluded that poor
are not “good personnel policy and not
a good investment.” “It takes time,” he
working relationships have contributed
added, “to figure out how government
to the Legislature’s inability to adworks.” In other words, legislators
dress critical and pressing issues facing
would benefit from greater expertise
Oregon. In addition, many witnesses reand institutional knowledge. Longtime
inforced the conclusion that Oregonians
professional staff in the Oregon House
tend to believe that legislators cannot
of Representatives agreed, noting
work well together, which may have the
that in each session, they work with a
effect of causing the public to become
different body of members, making it
disengaged from politics. For all of these
difficult to establish long-term working
reasons, your committee concluded that
relationships: “You get to know them
potential solutions should be considered
and then they go home.” Exacerbating
to remedy this lack
the problem is the
of civility in the
two-year election
“Representatives seeking
Legislature.
cycle for the House
reelection every two years
of Representatives.
are forced to campaign
Representatives
perpetually to enhance the
An Analysis of
seeking reelection
likelihood
of
reelection.
Potential
every two years are
This
constant
campaigning
Solutions
forced to campaign
increases their dependence
perpetually to enon interest groups,
Your commithance the likelihood
decreases time spent on
tee considered a
of reelection. This
legislative work, and
number of reforms
constant campaigndiminishes
cooperation
that might reduce
ing increases their
often
necessary
to
achieve
the excesses of
dependence on
results.”
partisanship and
interest groups, destrengthen positive
creases time spent
working relationships within the Legon legislative work, and diminishes
islature. These potential solutions are
cooperation often necessary to achieve
described below.
results.
Your committee therefore recommends
extending legislative terms in the House
to four years and extending legislative
terms in the Senate to six years.

Longer Terms for Legislators
Several witnesses supported longer
terms for legislators. Former Oregon
Supreme Court Judge Hans Linde, also a
member of PCOL, noted the advantages
of six-year terms in the U.S. Senate,
which gives senators time to build
relationships and accept the obligations
of statesmanship. Short terms, he said,

Annual Legislative Sessions of
Limited Length
Several witnesses, including former
state legislators Eileen Qutub and Max
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Williams, both Republicans, suggested
that meeting every year — as opposed
to every other year — would allow
legislators to develop policy and institutional expertise and would promote
better working relationships. While
some witnesses thought annual sessions
would eliminate too many potential
legislative candidates from the process
because of the increased time demands,
this concern could be ameliorated by
limiting session length. Under such a
proposal, the Legislature would have a
regular session during odd years and a
short budget session in even years. The
PCOL recommended that the Legislature experiment with annual sessions by
convening both in 2007 and 2008, then
deciding whether to institute annual
sessions permanently. (See Appendix D.)
The Legislature has acted on this recommendation and held a limited session in
February 2008.

recommended a March date because
the state Office of Economic Analysis
releases revenue projections on March
1.* Much of the Legislature’s important
business awaits that information.
The PCOL recommended that the
Legislature establish a new date for the
beginning of the legislative session. (See
Appendix D.) Your committee specifically recommends that the session begin
in March.

Improved Training and
Relationship-Building for
Legislators
Many of your committee’s witnesses
recommended pre-session conferences
and retreats as a way for legislators to
get to know one another better. In the
past, they noted, such gatherings helped
build collegiality and trust. Professional
legislative staff, including Chief Clerk
of the House Ramona Kenady and Secretary of the Senate Judy Hall, were the
strongest advocates for such pre-session
conferences and retreats. They argued
that better orientation and socialization
before the session helped legislators
gain a deeper understanding of each
other and each other’s issues. Those
witnesses pointed out that a pre-session
conference would also allow the two
houses to facilitate the upcoming session by electing their leaders, appointing committees and educating members

Your committee recommends amending
the Oregon Constitution to allow for annual sessions of prescribed length.

Change in Timing of Session
Ramona Kenady, who has served as
Chief Clerk of the House since 1985,
suggested shifting the start date of
the session from January to March.
The extra time would give legislators a
cooling-off period after inherently partisan campaigns, as well as more time to
prepare for the session. This additional
period would also permit legislators to
receive more training and get to know
each other better. Witnesses specifically

* The Legislature also receives information
throughout the session about the fiscal impact
of proposed legislation from staff members in
the Legislative Fiscal Office and the Legislative
Revenue Office.
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on both the legislative process and the
key issues. The PCOL similarly recommended that the Legislature enhance
legislator orientation curriculum to
include more training in subject matter
and procedural areas. (See Appendix
D.) A pre-session conference would also
provide an opportunity for the Ways
and Means Committee to examine the
budget and the economic forecast carefully before the session begins.

independent commission at a level that
attracts well-qualified candidates. (See
Appendix D.)
Your committee considered the argument that low salaries might discourage otherwise competent people from
running for office and that increased salaries would broaden the pool of people
willing and interested in becoming
legislators. Furthermore, your committee also considered the argument that a
significant increase in salary might send
the message that the public expects the
Legislature to act in a more professional
manner. Nevertheless, your committee
concluded that it could neither make
nor rule out a connection between salary and excessive partisanship.

Your committee recommends that both
legislative houses organize annual presession conference retreats to promote
positive legislative relationships and to
prepare for the subsequent legislative
session.

Increased Salaries for Legislators
A wide cross-section of your committee’s witnesses supported increased
salaries for legislators. Judy Hall, Secretary of the Senate, said that legislators
should earn a decent salary, and noted
they make far less than they should considering the work they do and the hours
they work. Members of the Legislature
are compensated $19,884 per year, plus
$109 per day they are in session.21 Since
the average odd-year regular session
lasts about six months and even-year
special sessions appear to last about 20
days, each member receives approximately $34,000 during odd years and
$22,000 during even years. This averages out to $28,000 per year.
The PCOL specifically recommended
that salaries for state elected officials,
including legislators, be set by an
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Chapter Conclusions
➤➤ Courteous and extensive working
relationships among experienced
legislators contribute to good
deliberation.
➤➤ The Legislature has experienced an
unraveling of relationships, which
has inhibited its ability to function
well as a deliberative body.

Chapter
Recommendations
➤➤ The Legislature should refer to
voters a constitutional amendment
that would establish four-year
terms for members of the House of
Representatives and six-year terms
for members of the Senate.
➤➤ The Legislature should refer to
voters a constitutional amendment
that would establish annual legislative sessions of limited length, commencing in March, shortly after the
state Office of Economic Analysis
releases its first revenue projections
for the year.
➤➤ The Legislature should hold presession conference retreats to
provide more training and more opportunities for legislators to forge
productive professional relationships across party lines.
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EXCESSIVE PARTISANSHIP IN
CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS
Your committee recognized that political campaigns are inherently partisan.
Competition between parties highlights
major issues, excites public interest, and
provides voters with clear policy alternatives. No election system is perfect and
each involves trade offs. While your
committee heard numerous criticisms
about how the current system frequently contributes to excessive partisanship,
your committee did not have sufficient
evidence to conclude that any alternative
election system is clearly preferable.
Nonetheless, several aspects of elections
contribute to excessive partisanship and
ought to be considered.

who want to run as independents and
who may be less beholden to partisan
interest groups also face an uphill battle
because of the risk that voters will consider them “spoilers.” Voters who would
ideally prefer to support such candidates frequently choose not to do so for
fear of tipping the election toward the
major-party candidate they like least.
In addition, in districts where one party
has a “safe” majority, elections are
essentially decided in the primary, leaving members of the other major party
and independents (about 21 percent
of Oregon voters) without a meaningful vote.22 During the redistricting
process, competitive districts can be
transformed into safe districts for the
benefit of incumbents and the party in
power. When the state is divided into
many safe districts, winning candidates
tend to be more partisan, as successful
candidates appeal to partisan voters in
the primary election rather than appealing to a mix of partisan, independent,
and cross-over voters in the general
election. As a result, staunch conser-

The current system of holding “closed”
partisan primary elections before the
general election gives voters who register with the two major parties greater
influence than voters who choose to
remain independent. As independent
voters are not allowed to participate
in the major partisan primaries, those
voters receive the implicit message that
they must be on one of the two major
“teams” to be real “players.” Candidates
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vatives and liberals are more likely to
win election than centrist or moderate
members of each party, not to mention
independents. Voters who have a less
ideological orientation — even when
they comprise a significant portion of a
district’s population — feel under-represented and often view the Legislature as
overly polarized and partisan.

your committee evaluated whether our
electoral process makes it difficult for
candidates to succeed if they do not
engage in excessively partisan behavior.
Your committee concluded that it does.
This is not meant to assert any preference for centrists as opposed to staunch
conservative or liberal office-holders,
but rather for an electoral system that
does not systematically disadvantage
any one part of the political spectrum.

Finally, the high cost and lengthy duration of campaigns make candidates
dependent on
interest groups and
“Your committee…does…
party leaders, which
[n]ot assert any preference
reinforces excessive
for centrists as opposed
partisanship. Each
to staunch conservative
of these factors,
or liberal office-holders,
along with a number
but rather for an electoral
of potential reforms, system that does not
will be addressed in
systematically disadvantage
this chapter.
any one part of the political

Election observers
often note that
candidates position themselves as
staunch conservatives or liberals to
win the primary
and then swing
back to the center
to win the general
election. While the
apparent duplicity
of such posturing may be troublesome
in itself, it reveals a more fundamental
problem. Candidates often must make
commitments to gain the support of
party faithful in the primary. Once
elected, such commitments tie their
hands when the Legislature confronts
difficult and controversial policy issues
that cannot be resolved without some
compromise. In addition, legislators
who strive to serve their entire districts
and support legislative compromises
can be forced out of office by a majority
of the voters in their party’s primary,
even if a majority of their constituents
would re-elect them.

spectrum.”

The Electoral
Process
Your committee is of the opinion
that the Legislature benefits from the
presence of members of both parties
who are willing to consider supporting
legislation proposed by members of the
opposing party and who can serve to
broker compromises on contentious issues. Your committee is convinced that
the presence of such members often
makes the difference between a truly
deliberative body and one in which the
majority party forces through as much
as it can while the minority party blocks
as much as it can. For that reason,
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Most of the remainder of this chapter
will be devoted to examining reforms
of the redistricting process, campaign
finance, and the election system to
decide whether they would likely help
to redress the tendency of the current
systems to exclude those in the middle
and to help mitigate excessive partisanship. Before analyzing those reforms,
however, your committee briefly comments on the initiative and referendum
system, which a number of witnesses
tied to excessive partisanship.

Oregonians established the initiative
and referendum systems early in the
twentieth century, when public distrust
of politicians was at an all-time high, in
an effort to return a degree of political
authority to the citizenry. Unfortunately, the initiative and referendum
have not proven to be a good means of
developing creative solutions to complex
and difficult problems. With the initiative process, voters are presented with
a simple yes or no choice on issues proposed by an individual or group interested enough to fund a successful petition
signature-gathering effort. Conversely,
when a legislator knows that hard work
and compromise on controversial issues might not please politically active
voters and can be overturned through
the initiative or referendum process,
and when that legislator knows that the
voters may use the ballot to punish the
legislator for addressing those issues,
few legislators are willing to take risks.

The Initiative and
Referendum
A number of witnesses, including former Senator Ben Westlund and former
Representative Max Williams, pointed
to the frequent use of the initiative, referendum and legislative referral systems
as supporting excessive partisanship
in that the process provides legislators
with little incentive to compromise
on tough issues. Williams suggested
that initiatives, referenda and referrals transfer legislative responsibilities
directly to voters and allow legislators
themselves to avoid engaging in meaningful deliberation. He asked, “How do
you position yourself around an issue
that you can’t control?” Similarly, Eileen
Qutub, a Republican who served as both
a representative and a senator, noted
that the availability of the referendum
often means that legislators themselves
do not have to vote on complex or controversial issues.

The initiative and referendum processes
have contributed to excessive partisanship by casting issues in black and white
and inhibiting nuanced understanding
and compromise on important issues.
The PCOL recommended that the initiative be reformed to “[e]stablish a regular
process for considering and possibly
taking legislative action on initiative
proposals.” The PCOL also recommended several reforms to address the
problem of the sponsorship and financing of initiatives by out-of-state interest
groups. (See Appendix D.) More recently, City Club of Portland specifically
recommended the implementation of
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an indirect initiative system* to improve
legislative governance in Oregon.23 Your
committee believes that such a system
would mitigate excessive partisanship
by creating opportunities for deliberation and compromise in the Legislature
before an issue is put to the voters.

ORS 188.010 also establishes nonpartisan criteria for redistricting:
1.

Each district, as nearly as practicable, shall:
a. Be contiguous;
b. Be of equal population;
c. Utilize existing geographic or
political boundaries;
d. Not divide communities of
common interest; and
e. Be connected by transportation links.

2.

No district shall be drawn for the
purpose of favoring any political
party, incumbent legislator or
other person.

3.

No district shall be drawn for
the purpose of diluting the voting strength of any language or
ethnic minority group.

4.

Two state House of Representative districts shall be wholly
included within a single state
senatorial district.25

Redistricting
The Present System
The Oregon Constitution requires the
Legislature to re-draw districts for Senators and Representatives according to
population in the first session after each
U.S. census. The Constitution also specifies that the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction to review any reapportionment enacted by the Legislature. If the
Legislature fails to complete the task by
the close of the legislative session, or if
the Supreme Court rejects the proposed
reapportionment plan, the responsibility defaults to the secretary of state
who has forty-five days to propose new
districts.24

Although ORS 188.010 specifically
prohibits redistricting to favor any party
or person, your committee concluded
that it was probably impossible to avoid
at least the perception that redistricting is used for partisan purposes as
redistricting in Oregon is in the hands
of party-affiliated elected officials. The
party controlling redistricting can gain
political advantage by drawing the district lines so as to favor that party’s candidates. That party may do so in three
principal ways: (1) packing voters of
the minority party into as few districts

* The specific recommendation for implementing an indirect initiative system is as
follows: “In order to enhance public debate,
consideration and study prior to a vote of the
people, require legislative deliberation with attendant public hearings for all citizen initiatives
after they have qualified for the ballot. If the
Legislature accepts a statutory initiative as proposed, the Legislature enacts it into law. If the
Legislature accepts a constitutional initiative
as proposed, the constitutional change must
still be referred to the voters for adoption. Any
initiative the Legislature rejects (regardless of
subject) would be submitted to the voters in the
next election. In that case, the Legislature could
take no further action, could enact its own
law on the subject, or could refer a competing
alternative to the voters.”
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as possible, leaving a larger number of
other districts favorable to the majority party; (2) redrawing districts so that
two minority party incumbents are in
the same district where no more than
one can be elected at the next election;
and (3) redrawing the borders so that
the incumbent from the majority party
has a “safe” margin of victory in future
elections. Such tactics allow the majority to obtain an electoral advantage out
of proportion to the majority’s level of
support among voters statewide.

districting plan that was promptly
vetoed by Democratic Governor John
Kitzhaber. As the Republican majority
in the Legislature failed to overturn
the governor’s veto, the redistricting
task fell to then-Secretary of State Bill
Bradbury, a Democrat. Ted Ferrioli,
Senate Republican Leader, claimed that
Secretary of State Bradbury’s redistricting plan exhibited a greater degree of
partisanship than the prior plan by former Democratic Secretary of State Phil
Keisling, because borders were allegedly
moved very small distances for no clear
reason other than the
Republicans’ resultant loss
of control of the Senate. An
editorial in The Oregonian
echoed Ferrioli’s claim:
“Republicans have been furious at [Secretary of State
Bill] Bradbury ever since he
sketched an overtly partisan redistricting map that
helped Democrats reclaim
the state Senate.”28

The Oregon Legislature has repeatedly failed to redistrict. In fact, “[t]he
battle over redistricting is so contentious,” writes Professor Clucas, “that the
Legislature has not actually completed
redistricting since 1911.”26 For example,
in 1971 and 1991, the Legislature failed
to complete its redistricting plan on
time because in each of these years the
two legislative houses were controlled
by different parties. In 1961 and 1981,
legal challenges tied up the plan.27

Bradbury proposed a reapportionment
that fourteen separate groups challenged.
In Hartung v. Bradbury, the Oregon
Supreme Court rejected all the challenges but one relatively minor one.29 In
particular, the Supreme Court rejected a
challenge that the secretary of state violated the Oregon statute discussed above
that prohibits drawing districts to benefit
any particular political party.
Examples of redistricting abuse from
other states abound. The highly contentious 2003 Republican-controlled
redistricting process in Texas enabled

In 2001, the Republican-controlled
Legislature in Oregon passed a re-
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Republicans to gain 6 additional seats
in the U.S. House of Representatives.
In 2002, Maryland’s Democrats redrew
the district lines and picked up two U.S.
House seats. In 2001, Virginia’s Republicans took control of the redistricting
process and increased their control of
the state house from just over one-half
to two-thirds, even though a Democrat
won the statewide race for Governor.30

such a conclusion makes sense. Take for
example a region with equal numbers of
Democrats and Republicans that must
be divided into two electoral districts. If
the lines are drawn so that both districts
have equal numbers of Democrats and
Republicans, then it seems likely that
their elections will result in contests
between a moderate Democrat and a
moderate Republican, and the winner
will be someone who can appeal to indeYour committee concluded that it will
pendents and moderate members of the
always be impossible to determine the
other party. On the other hand, if the
motivations of legislators in passing
region is split so that one district has all
or not passing a plan for redistricting,
the Democrats and
of the governor in
one district has all
“[A]s long as the
vetoing or not vetoredistricting process is
the Republicans,
ing a plan passed
controlled by partisan
then the real conby the Legislature,
elected officials, the
or of the secretary
test in each district
perception — if not the
of state if the work
will take place
reality — that the process is
should fall to that
during the primary.
characterized by excessive
office. But as long
The winner in one
partisanship will be a
as the redistricting
district will be the
perennial problem.”
process is conDemocrat who has
trolled by partisan
the most support
elected officials, the
among Democrats,
perception — if not the reality — that
while the winner in the other district
the process is characterized by excessive
will be the Republican who has the most
partisanship will be a perennial probsupport among Republicans.
lem. The perception alone can give rise
to unnecessary animosity between the
Although some scholars contend that no
parties and prompt even more excescausal relationship exists between less
sively partisan behavior.
competitive districts and polarization,
most authorities agree that competitive
districts make it easier for moderate
candidates to win elections. In their
article on electoral competitiveness,
Professors Mark Kayser of the University of Rochester and Drew Linzer of
Emory University cite research finding

In addition to examining whether excessive partisanship characterizes the redistricting process, your committee also
considered whether non-competitive
districts resulting from partisan redistricting reduce the likelihood of the election of moderates. As a matter of logic,
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that politicians elected from competitive districts are more responsive to
their median constituents.31 Similarly,
legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin writes that
scholarly research supports the conclusion that partisan gerrymandering
leads to the election of more ideological
candidates who appeal to their party’s
base. Toobin observes that redistricting has transformed American politics,
making the U.S. House of Representatives in particular more entrenched:
“Members of the House now effectively
answer only to primary voters, who
represent the extreme partisan edge of
both parties. As a result, collaboration
and compromise between the parties
have almost disappeared.”32

voters usually select candidates
similarly close to their parties’
ideological extremes. This leaves
fewer members of Congress in
the political center, or with any
incentive to work toward bipartisan solutions. Conversely, in
competitive districts, it’s the
general election that matters,
when candidates must appeal to
independents and cross-overs
to win. Candidates who can
build such bridges with the electorate are more likely to do the
same with colleagues from the
‘other side’ once in office.”33
Your committee concludes that there
exists — at minimum — a widespread
perception that excessive partisanship
characterizes the redistricting process.
Your committee also concludes that
excessively partisan redistricting, when
it does occur, generally results in the
creation of “safe districts” where candidates who are less partisan face greater
obstacles to winning elections.

A 2005 conference hosted by The
Council for Excellence in Government
and The Campaign Legal Center reached
similar conclusions about polarization
which results from excessively partisan
redistricting. The argument might be
applied to the impact of excessively
partisan redistricting in Oregon:
“A clear connection exists between the geopolitics of redistricting for partisan safety and
the growing partisanship in the
House of Representatives and
in many state legislatures. In
safe districts, the party primary
is the key election and even that
often is not very competitive. In
safe districts, the small primary
turnout of a party’s most ardent
partisans determines who goes
to Washington (or the statehouse), and these core partisan

Proposed Redistricting Reforms
Although the House and the PCOL
have both made proposals to minimize
partisan abuse of redistricting, neither
proposal has been implemented. In the
2005 session of the Oregon Legislature,
Representative Debi Farr, Democrat
from Eugene, introduced a Joint Resolution (HJR 39) to establish an independent redistricting commission. Had
it been enacted, the resolution would
have created a five-member redistrict-
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ing commission of state and federal
judges. The bill passed the House but
died in the Senate Rules Committee. In
2006 the PCOL recommended creating a nonpartisan State Controller to
manage, administer, and oversee state
elections, election policy, campaign
finance administration, and investigations including elections and ethics
issues. Management, administration,
and oversight responsibilities would
also include legislative redistricting.
The State Controller would appoint a
five-member redistricting commission,
consisting of individuals who have not
held public office or political party office
within two years of their appointment.
The State Controller would have at least
a six-year term and be prohibited from
seeking statewide elective office for two
years afterward. (See Appendix D.)

Your committee recommends the establishment of a nonpartisan redistricting
commission in Oregon because such a
commission would not only be more
effective than the current system, which
has not worked since 1911, but would
also reduce the abuses of excessive partisanship. While not a perfect solution,
a nonpartisan redistricting commission,
made up of members with a crosssection of political beliefs, would be the
best way to prevent excessively partisan
redistricting and address the perception
that redistricting decisions are motivated by partisan concerns.
If Oregon establishes a redistricting
commission, many details will need
to be addressed, such as the number
of members and their qualifications,
the appointment process, and procedural rules and timelines. An important
subject that must also be addressed is
what roles the legislative, executive and
judicial branches will play if there is a
commission with primary responsibility for redistricting. The twelve states
with nonpartisan redistricting commissions have set up their commissions in
different ways, and there is extensive
literature comparing and analyzing
them. Because of the complexity of
the subject, your committee recommends that City Club establish another
research committee to prepare a more
detailed recommendation on the form
and function of a nonpartisan redistricting commission.

Given the pervasive abuse of partisan
redistricting across the nation, twenty
states have established commissions
to help in the redistricting process. In
twelve of these states, the commissions
have primary authority for redistricting.
Three state commissions are advisory
and develop plans that are submitted to
the Legislature for approval. Five state
commissions prepare redistricting plans
if the legislatures are unable to agree on
plans within the allotted time. The commissions in these various states have between three and fifteen members. In all
these states active politicians and party
leaders play a part in selecting commission members. Otherwise, existing state
redistricting commissions vary widely in
make-up and responsibilities.
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Campaigns and
Campaign Finance
How Rising Campaign Costs Have
Fueled Excessive Partisanship
Many witnesses identified the increasing cost of elections, with the resultant
need to raise more funds from interest
groups, as a reason for excessive partisanship. House campaigns now cost
between $300,000 to $400,000 and Senate campaigns cost between $750,000
to $1,000,000.34 On a per capita basis,
this cost ranges between $5.50 to $8.00
per district resident. Hotly contested
campaigns can be much higher. The high
cost of campaigns has meant that legislators are constantly concerned with
raising money. Besides distracting them
from the deliberative process, such reliance on campaign funds also threatens
to make legislators less likely to assert
their independence when it comes to
making legislative policy choices.

debate. As noted earlier in this report,
much of the money for campaigns
comes from the lobby and interest
groups, which support candidates in
order to obtain access to the candidate
once elected. Once a candidate becomes
dependent on these funds, he or she
then has a difficult time taking a position or making a statement at odds
with that group’s particular agenda.
Candidates receiving large sums of such
money are often expected to make very
specific and uncompromising statements in support of the interest group’s
positions. While such absolute and certain statements can be helpful to voters
trying to identify a particular candidate’s stance on issues, they can also
lead to excessive partisanship. When a
candidate takes an uncompromising position during a campaign, opponents of
that position have very little hope to be
able to work with that candidate should
he or she get elected. Such rigidity raises
the stakes of the election for these
individuals and fosters a win-at-all-

The cost of campaigns has risen
dramatically for a variety of reasons.
Vote-by-mail, an Oregon innovation,
has increased costs because candidates
need to keep their message in front of
voters for an extended period of time
as opposed to concentrating it in the
days immediately before election day.
Another reason for the increased cost
of campaigns is that campaigns have
become more professional, with paid
consultants shaping the message and
content.
Reliance on money from partisan interest groups can polarize the campaign
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costs mentality. A much more divisive,
personal and bitterly fought campaign
usually results, making reconciliation
with one’s opponents extremely difficult
after the election.

paign-finance transparency. The PCOL
did not make specific recommendations
on any of these topics. Rather, it recommended that a commission be formed
to examine the role of campaign finance
in legislative decision-making, that the
Legislature reform the use of campaign
funds by candidates and elected officials, and that consideration be given to
moving the primary election date later
to shorten the campaign season. (See
Appendix D.)

In addition to the growing costs of campaigning and the increasing dependence
of candidates on their financial contributors, witnesses also reported increased
caucus control over campaign funding.
If a legislator crosses the party line,
or insufficiently supports the party’s
agenda, that legislator may not receive
adequate financial support from his or
her caucus in the next election. Former
representative Tony Van Vliet of Corvallis observed that the challenge is getting
people “who will really level and work
toward solutions” and that the main
barrier to making this happen is caucus
control over campaign funding.

Public Ownership and Financing of
Elections
While the proposal for public financing
of elections met with general support
from journalists, lobbyists and other
witnesses, these witnesses invariably
pointed out that the proposal lacks
public support and that a very vocal
minority opposes it. In 1976 two of
your committee’s witnesses, Attorney General and former Speaker of
the House Hardy Myers and former
Oregon Supreme Court Judge Hans
Linde, were instrumental in qualifying
a ballot measure — Measure 7 — for a
constitutional amendment to provide
partial public financing of elections, but
voters defeated this measure 659,327 to
263,738.

Your committee concluded that the
financial imperatives of legislative
electoral campaigns lead to reliance on
money from partisan interest groups
and the caucus leadership, which in turn
leads to excessive partisanship, and that
a number of potential campaign finance
reforms should be considered.

Analyzing Campaign
Finance-Reform Options

Your committee concluded that public
financing of elections might potentially
minimize excessive partisanship, but
your committee did not obtain enough
evidence or conduct sufficient research
to conclude that adopting such a system
would successfully reduce the influence

Your committee focused on three options for addressing the negative impact
of campaign costs on partisanship: (1)
public ownership and financing of elections, (2) campaign contribution and
spending limits and (3) greater cam-
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of those who have substantial money
to spend on elections. Furthermore,
your committee doubted that sufficient
political will and public support existed
to institute such a system state-wide.
However, if the City of Portland’s
“voter-owned elections” system proves
to work well, that success might make
it worthwhile to consider adopting a
similar system for state elections.

Some witnesses, including opinion researchers Tim Hibbitts and Bob Moore,
maintained that campaign finance
legislation would actually contribute to
polarization. When direct contributions
to campaigns are limited, more money
flows to political action committees that
are not responsible to any candidate
and that frequently engage in malicious
campaign advertising. The journalists
Jeff Mapes of The Oregonian, Charles
Beggs of the Associated Press, and
Peter Wong of The Statesman Journal
also pointed out that campaign finance
limitations have not reduced excessive
partisanship in Congress.

Limits on Campaign Contributions
and Spending
Various provisions for campaign contribution or spending limits in Oregon
have been proposed over time. In 1997,
the Oregon Supreme Court struck down
limits on campaign contributions and
expenditures as violating the right to
engage in political speech protected in
the Oregon Constitution.35 The following year proponents of campaign finance
reform passed Measure 62, which sought
to amend the Constitution, but the
Oregon Supreme Court invalidated that
measure because it unconstitutionally
violated the separate vote requirement
of the Constitution.36 More recently, in
2006, proponents of campaign finance
reform succeeded in placing Measures 46
and 47 on the ballot. Ballot Measure 46,
which did not pass, proposed amending the Constitution to allow campaign
contribution and expenditure limitations. Ballot Measure 47, which did pass,
proposed the specific limitations. Since
Ballot Measure 47 was dependent upon
the passage of Measure 46, these limitations have not become law.

Your committee agreed that placing limits on campaign contributions
would not alleviate excessive partisanship as money would likely be used in
other ways by groups less accountable
than candidates. Your committee was
also concerned about the questionable
constitutionality of restricting people’s
rights to support candidates or issues.
Greater Campaign Finance
Transparency
In 2005 the Legislature passed HB
3458, directing the secretary of state
to develop an electronic filing system
where campaign committees would be
required to file contribution and expenditure information. The system, called
ORESTAR, became fully functional on
January 1, 2007. The law creating ORESTAR required that:
•
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campaign finance information
electronically with the secretary of
state’s office.
•

•

explained in more detail below. Your
committee attempted to determine
whether these potential reforms might
reduce or increase partisanship by examining each reform against features of
good electoral and legislative processes
hurt by excessive partisanship.

Candidates and committees continuously report campaign finance
information, with most reports due
within thirty days of the transaction; in the six weeks prior to
the election the filing deadline is
reduced to within seven days of the
transaction; and certain candidates
and committees must report contributions during a legislative session
within two days.

As stated previously, these positive
features include: ease of recruitment of
well-qualified candidates for legislative
office; high electoral participation, and
the election of legislators who serve
all voters, not just those affiliated with
major parties or strong special interests;
good relationships and civility among
legislators; deliberation and resolution
of policy issues with input from the majority and minority; and public respect
for and confidence in the Legislature.

Contributor and payee aggregates
must be reported once specified
thresholds have been reached.

In the words of Troy Nichols, chief of
staff to former House Speaker Karen
Minnis during the 2005 legislative session, the system would offer “real-time,
prompt, frequent reporting that people
can see and understand.” It would make
candidates “think twice,” he added,
“about taking that large contribution.”

All of the reforms your committee
considered have advantages over our
current system and have the potential
to mitigate excessive partisanship. This
report provides your committee’s analysis below but does not make a recommendation for any single one of them.
Minimizing partisanship is not the sole
criterion for a good election system,
and a more comprehensive analysis
should inform any decision to overhaul
Oregon’s elections system.

The new web-based contribution reporting system certainly has provided increased transparency, but it is too early
to tell if this greater transparency has
diminished excessive partisanship.

Election Reforms
Your committee also examined a
number of other potential election
system reforms, including nonpartisan
elections, the top-two primary, instant
run-off voting, multi-member districts,
and fusion voting, all of which will be
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Election
Reform

Key Characteristic

Status

Nonpartisan
Elections

Ballot does not identify
party affiliation of candidates.

Nebraska possesses the only nonpartisan
state legislature. Many county and city
elections in Oregon and across the U.S.
are nonpartisan. PCOL recommended
consideration of this reform.

Top-Two
Primary

All candidates participate
in one primary, and the top
two candidates advance to
the general election.

Used in several states, including Washington. Recommended by PCOL in 2006.
Ballot measure defeated in 2008.

Instant
Run-Off /
RankedChoice Voting

Voters rank all candidates
on the ballot. Votes for the
last-place candidate are
reallocated to voters’ next
preferences. This process
repeats until one candidate
has a majority of the votes.

Used by a few local jurisdictions in the
U.S., but none in Oregon. Advocates have
introduced instant-run-off bills several
times in the Oregon Legislature.

MultiMember
Districts /
Proportional
Representation

Legislative districts are
made larger so that two or
more candidates are elected
from each district.

U.S. Senate districts have two members.
The Oregon Legislature had multi-member districts prior to the 1970s.

Fusion Voting

A minor party can endorse
the same candidate as a
major party, and voters
can select which party they
prefer when they cast their
votes for that candidate.

Legal in seven states, but only actively
used in New York and Connecticut. The
Working Families Party, which is active in
New York, is advocating for fusion voting
in Oregon.

Nonpartisan Elections /
Nonpartisan Legislature

and voters, and simply serves to narrow
the field to two candidates for the general election. Only one state, Nebraska,
holds nonpartisan elections for its
Legislature and organizes its Legislature
along nonpartisan lines. Nebraska’s Legislature has no majority or minority cau-

In a nonpartisan election, the ballot lists
candidates without identifying their
party affiliation. If a “primary” election
exists at all, it is open to all candidates
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Top-Two Primary

cuses. During the 2005 Oregon Legislative session, Democratic Senator Charlie
Ringo sponsored legislation that would
have made the Oregon Legislature
nonpartisan, but the bill did not make
it out of the Senate’s Rules Committee.
In 2006, the PCOL recommended that
each house of the Legislature should be
free to determine whether its members
will be elected with partisan labels. (See
Appendix D.)

In a top-two primary, all registered
voters, regardless of party affiliation or
non-affiliation, would receive the same
primary ballot and would be free to vote
for any candidate seeking to advance to
the general election. The two candidates
receiving the most votes would then
advance to the general election. Those
two candidates might be from the same
political party, from different parties, or
report no party affiliation at all.

Your committee is of the opinion that
a nonpartisan legislature might result
in better deliberation and resolution
of policy issues because agendas and
debates would not be controlled by
party leadership — a type of control
that your committee concluded had led
to excessive partisanship in the past.
In addition, your committee believes
that a nonpartisan legislature would
result in improved civility and better
relationships between legislators of different political ideologies. But although
independent voters and voters in the
political minority would have a greater
chance to participate, voters in general
would have to make more of an effort to
learn about policy issues and legislators’
positions, as voters would not have the
parties to define the issues for them.
Your committee was concerned, therefore, that less motivated voters might
pay insufficient attention to issues
without some partisan guidance, giving
activist voters and partisan interest
groups greater influence, a factor that
your committee concluded had led to
excessive partisanship under the present system.

In 2006, the PCOL recommended the
creation of what it referred to as an
“open” primary, but which in the political science literature is more commonly
understood as a top-two primary. (See
Appendix D.) Washington state held its
first top-two primary in 2008.
In 2008, supporters of the top-two primary in Oregon succeeded in gathering
enough signatures to place a top-two
primary proposal on the ballot. A separate City Club committee recommended
against supporting that ballot initiative.
That committee expressed concerns that
a top-two primary might decrease voter
participation in the general election, as
limiting the general election to two candidates might exclude some of Oregon’s
qualified political parties from the general election, making some voters affiliated with those unrepresented parties
less likely to participate. The committee
also expressed concern that moderate
voters might run the risk of diluting
their influence by spreading their votes
among numerous moderate candidates,
thereby allowing a minoity
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Instant Run-Off / Ranked-Choice
Voting

of diehard supporters of extreme candidates to advance their candidates to
the general election. That committee
also observed that national and societal
influences contribute to excessive
partisanship in Oregon and questioned
whether electoral changes at the state
level could ameliorate the problem.37
The top-two primary initiative ultimately was defeated at the polls.

In an instant run-off election, voters
rank all the candidates on the ballot.
Voters’ first choices are tallied first.
Then the candidate with the least votes
is eliminated. The votes for that candidate are reallocated to other candidates
based on voters’ second choices. That
process continues until two candidates
remain. The candidate with more than
50 percent of the vote wins.

Although the 2008 City Club ballot measure report expressed concerns about
the potentially negative unintended
consequences of the top-two primary,
the Washington top-two primary
system, which has only been in place
since 2008, provides a valuable opportunity for Oregonians to observe how
such a system would operate in practice
over time. Your committee encourages
observers to pay close attention in
particular to the following: (1) whether
voter participation increases or decreases in the primary election and in the
general election, particularly in districts
that are predominantly Democratic or
Republican, (2) whether vote dilution
affects moderate candidates more than
extreme candidates in the primary, (3)
whether the general election winners in
predominantly Democratic or Republican districts tend to be more moderate
than in the past due to the influence of
minority-party voters in the primary
and (4) whether elected legislators
who compromise with opposing party
members on major policy issues are able
to win reelection with the support of
cross-over voters.

As an illustration, in an election with
three candidates and one hundred voters, the initial tally might look like this:
• Candidate A (conservative) 40 votes
• Candidate B (moderate)
35 votes
• Candidate C (liberal)
25 votes
Candidate C is the first to be eliminated,
and the 25 votes for that candidate are
redistributed. If 20 of the voters who
preferred Candidate C listed Candidate
B as their second choice and the other
5 listed Candidate A as their second
choice, Candidate B would be elected
and the final tally would look like this:
• Candidate B (moderate)
55 votes
• Candidate A (conservative) 45 votes
In an instant run-off system, there
may be only a general election, with
no primary election. Another possible
variation involves using the instant
run-off method in the party primaries,
as well as in the general election. A few
local jurisdictions in the United States
have adopted instant run-off voting,
including San Francisco and Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
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Your committee believes that an instant
run-off system would promote better
dialogue during campaigns, as minor
parties would more likely be involved
and candidates would also likely need
to reach out to a broader spectrum of
voters in order to win “second choice”
votes. Your committee also thought that
the need to appeal to a broad spectrum
of voters would make the Legislature
more representative of the state as a
whole. Your committee also thought
that instant run-off elections had good
potential to increase voter participation because all voters would be able
to express their strongest preferences
while also having a say about other
candidates, potentially drawing in more
supporters of minority candidates.

fill seats from their candidates, typically according to a ranked candidate
list.
Your committee saw some potential for
proportional representation to improve
voter participation and for the Legislature to become more representative
of the population. Otherwise, your
committee was divided on the potential
impact of multi-member districts on
excessive partisanship.

Fusion Voting
In fusion voting, a candidate can seek
the nomination of both a major and a
minor party. Voters supporting that
candidate have the choice of casting
their votes either on the major party
ticket or on the minor party ticket.
Therefore, voters can express their support of a minor party’s platform without
“throwing away” their votes on a candidate who has no real chance of winning.
In this way, fusion voting shares one of
the main advantages of instant run-off
voting. Fusion voting has been adopted
in a few places in the United States,
including New York State.

Multi-Member Districts /
Proportional Representation
Proportional representation uses
larger districts from which two or
more members are elected, rather
than one member of the Legislature
being elected from each district. The
U.S. Senate is organized along these
lines, with two senators representing each state. In the past, Oregon
legislators represented multi-member
districts. The Legislature abolished
multi-member districts in a special
session in 1971.38 Nineteen states currently have multi-member districts for
their Legislatures, including Alaska,
Nevada and Washington. Europe also
has a form of proportional representation, where voters vote for parties
rather than candidates, and the parties

Your committee thought fusion voting
would allow more viewpoints to be expressed during campaigns, but some of
those views could be fringe or extreme,
causing more division than dialogue.
Your committee also thought that
fusion voting could motivate more supporters of minor parties to participate
in elections.
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Chapter
Recommendations

In summary, your committee concluded
that all of the above alternative voting
systems had the potential to minimize
partisanship, but your committee also
concluded that it did not currently have
the tools to recommend for or against
any of the specific alternatives. Your
committee, however, believes that all of
these alternatives are worthy of further
study.

➤➤ The Legislature should refer to
voters a constitutional amendment
establishing a nonpartisan redistricting commission.
➤➤ City Club of Portland should
establish a research committee to
prepare a detailed recommendation for a nonpartisan redistricting
commission.

Chapter Conclusions
➤➤ Oregon’s current election system contributes to excessive
partisanship by disadvantaging
independent candidates, centrist
candidates, and candidates who are
willing to compromise with members of the opposing party on major
policy issues.

➤➤ City Club should establish a research committee to study alternative election systems.

➤➤ Excessively partisan considerations
frequently influence the redistricting process, giving the party in
power at the time of redistricting a
tool to increase its power in a way
that does not accurately represent
the political make-up of the voters.
➤➤ The need to raise campaign funds
leads to excessive partisanship
because legislators are dependent
on party leadership and interest
groups aligned with the parties.
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HOW THE PUBLIC AND THE MEDIA
FUEL EXCESSIVE PARTISANSHIP
This report has focused primarily on
Studies by the National Conference
features of our electoral system and Legof State Legislatures suggest that the
islature that contribute to partisanship.
public neither understands how governFor the most part, these features can be
ment works nor feels connected to those
modified through changes in law, procewho get elected.39 Therefore, excessively
dure or administration. Many witnesses
partisan pressure on the Legislature
also commented on how the public and
may, to some extent, result from the
the media contribute to partisanship
fact that the public does not fully apin the Legislature.
preciate the difficulYour committee
ties of governance.
“[E]xcessive partisanship
concluded that exWhen the public
can result in part from the
cessive partisanship
does not apprepublic’s lack of knowledge
can result in part
ciate the costs,
regarding legislative
from the public’s
consequences or
processes and … this lack
lack of knowledge
tradeoffs that come
of knowledge in turn
regarding legislafrom adopting polistems from the relatively
tive processes and
cies, the public can
limited and poor quality
of media coverage of the
that this lack of
put enormous presLegislature.”
knowledge in turn
sure on legislators
stems from the relato adopt uncomprotively limited and
mising and excespoor quality of media coverage of the
sively partisan agendas that may not
Legislature. While public attitudes and
be entirely good for the state. Were the
media coverage are generally beyond the
public to gain a deeper understanding
reach of policy reforms, your committee
of the workings of the Legislature and
provides here an analysis of how the methe issues the Legislature considers, the
dia and public attitudes drive excessive
public might not insist on such partisan
partisanship.
agendas or be so quick to punish those
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who compromise. This better understanding would give legislators more
room to develop creative and effective
solutions to policy and budget problems.

The PCOL also recommended that the
Legislature improve public access to the
legislative process by providing better notice of meetings and bills under
consideration, and that the Legislature
contribute to funding a public broadcasting television channel for the 2007
session on a trial basis. (See Appendix
D.) In response, the Oregon Legislature,
Oregon Public Broadcasting, Southern
Oregon Public Television, the Oregon
University System and the Oregon
Public Affairs Network joined together
to form the Oregon Channel pilot project, which broadcasted gavel-to-gavel
coverage of the 2007 Oregon Legislative
session and other state government and
public affairs events. Your committee
concluded that the Legislature should
continue its efforts to increase public
knowledge of the legislative process and
that the Legislature should continue to
hold hearings around the state in order
to expand opportunities for public participation in policy making.

Former Senate Majority Leader Kate
Brown, a Democrat from Portland,
thought the Legislature might educate
the public and help mitigate excessive partisanship by holding more
public hearings and meetings outside
of Salem. Indeed, the Legislature has
recently endeavored to do so. During
the 2005 session, the Legislature held
hearings in twenty-two counties where
it heard testimony from more than a
thousand Oregonians. The Legislature
also changed the requirement for public
notice before hearings from 24 to 48
hours, giving the public more time to
prepare and respond.

Your committee also concluded that the
amount and quality of media coverage
of the Oregon political system must also
be improved to help mitigate excessive
partisanship. The number of reporters
in Salem covering the Legislature and
governmental issues has declined over
the last several decades, leaving the public without sufficiently balanced and informative coverage of legislative policy
issues and processes.40 Several witnesses
expressed the view that this media
phenomenon is a part of the coarsening
of society. Analyst Tim Hibbits tied it
to increasing attention on ratings: “You
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don’t generate high ratings by saying,
‘Let’s have a rational discussion.’”

As traditional media have sought to remain profitable by decreasing state and
local government news coverage, newsletters, talk radio commentators and
blogs have sought to fill some of that
vacuum. These alternate news sources
tend to have different missions than
traditional media. Some are providers
of entertainment, such as talk radio,
which mixes news and reaction. Others,
like blogs, provide venues for discussion
and opinion. These sources of “infotainment” and discussion do not have the
degree of objectivity that the public
expects from traditional media. In essence, a “buyer-beware” marketplace of
opinions and ideas has been created. The
multiplicity of sources may also make
it harder and more time consuming
to judge the credibility of a particular
source of information. Moreover, excessive partisanship can be exacerbated by
these information sources to the extent
that people rely on others’ strong opinions as news.

The Center for Media and Public Affairs (CMPA) conducted an analysis of
political advertising and political news
coverage in the Chicago, Milwaukee and
Portland markets, based on the month
before the 2004 November election.
During that month, of all the television news aired in the Portland market,
only 4.9 percent of airtime was devoted
to coverage of political campaigns and
elections. Seventy-eight percent of this
very limited coverage was devoted to
the presidential race. Conversely, only
1 percent focused on state legislative
or local candidate races. In fact, races
in Washington state and other states
garnered more coverage in the Portland
television market than Oregon state and
local races.41
This limited political coverage also
lacked substantive content. CMPA
found that over 60 percent of the local
television election coverage focused on
campaign strategy or the “horse race”
aspect of campaigns. Only 24 percent of
these stories focused on the underlying
issues at stake in the election.42 These
numbers suggest that the media is much
more inclined to cover the tactics and
poll-results of campaigns than they are
to inform the public about the policy
implications of their votes. One legislative veteran refused to blame the media,
however, because “the public is hooked
on the thirty-second sound-bite and is
not very tolerant of much detail.” Media
outlets are simply not rewarded for indepth coverage.

Although several witnesses expressed
hope that the Internet and expanded
use of blogs will increase information
available to the public and improve the
quality of political coverage, Professors Russ Dondero of Pacific University
and William Lunch of Oregon State
University, and political analyst Jim
Moore, suggest that such optimistic
claims may underestimate the public’s
desire to filter information sources to
suit personal or ideological biases. Some
newer forms of electronic media, such as
blogs and list-serves, allow the public to
seek information and then immediately
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react to that information with their own
thoughts and analysis.43 As a result,
news forums are experiencing increased
editorializing. Like the consumers of
political talk radio, readers of blogs and
newer forms of electronic media must
be more politically aware to understand
the difference between these forums
and mainstream news media.

conflict and ignores nuanced deliberation, the public loses confidence in the
Legislature and legislative processes.
Balanced and thorough coverage of issues and policy positions, accompanied
by accurate information about legislators themselves, is essential to the
development of an informed citizenry
that understands the complex deliberative processes that are essential to good
lawmaking.

Nevertheless, your committee recognized that this tendency for non-traditional media to exacerbate excessive
partisanship may be offset to some
degree by astute use of blogs. These
resources allow readers to explore,
weigh and compare numerous available
opinions and discussions on a particular
subject. The problem, of course, is that
this approach depends entirely on the
willingness of readers to seek out balanced perspectives and their ability to
find credible material.
Your committee concluded that the multiplicity of non-traditional media might
allow for the dissemination of a greater
variety of views, but that this opportunity must be balanced by individual
responsibility to use these resources
wisely. The Legislature itself also has
the opportunity, which many members
have been using, to provide significant
information through its web pages.
As explained above, a citizenry that appreciates the complexities of governance
is less likely to insist on excessively partisan agendas and to punish legislators
who make pragmatic compromises. The
media clearly plays a crucial role in this
regard. When media coverage focuses on
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Chapter Conclusions
➤➤ Limited and poor media coverage of
Oregon’s political system contributes to excessive partisanship.
➤➤ A public that is poorly informed
about legislative processes and
policy issues contributes to political
polarization.

Chapter
Recommendations
➤➤ The Legislature should continue to
build upon its efforts to conduct
legislative business in communities throughout the state and to
publish information and proceedings online.
➤➤ City Club should support efforts to
increase substantive and objective
policy news reporting in the media.
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CONCLUSIONS
1.

Partisanship serves to help develop and clarify competing visions of what is
best for Oregon and it helps focus the activities of voters and legislators from
different parties.

2.

Excessive partisanship is widely perceived as having increased over the past
several decades in Oregon.

3.

Excessive partisanship is a problem in Oregon that should be addressed because it impairs legislators’ ability to deliberate and collaborate on legislation,
results in legislative gridlock, discourages qualified candidates from running
for office and leads to voter disaffection.

4.

Limited and poor media coverage of the political system in Oregon has contributed to excessive partisanship.

5.

A public that is poorly informed about legislative processes and policy issues
contributes to political polarization.

6.

Oregon’s Republican and Democratic state parties are grassroots organizations
that serve the valuable function of involving citizens in the political process,
but they have little direct involvement in the state Legislature.

7.

Legislative caucus leaders and presiding officers possess more power than
the state parties when it comes to pressuring legislators to support partisan
agendas.

8.

Strong interest groups aligned with either the Democrats or the Republicans
often reinforce excessive partisanship by pressuring legislators to commit to
uncompromising agendas.

9.

Oregon’s current election system contributes to excessive partisanship by
disadvantaging independent candidates, centrist candidates, and candidates
who are willing to compromise with members of the opposing party on major
policy issues.

10. Excessively partisan considerations frequently influence the redistricting
process, giving the party in power at the time of redistricting a tool to increase
its power in a way that does not accurately represent the political make-up of
the voters.
11. Legislators become dependent on party leadership and interest groups aligned
with the parties because of the need to raise campaign funds.
12. Because of the structure of Oregon’s Legislature, which is characterized by a
strong-leader system, the leaders have tremendous discretion and set the tone
for partisanship or collaboration.
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13. As most of Oregon’s legislative rules are subject to revision by simple-majority
vote, they can be — and have been — easily manipulated to satisfy the immediate demands of the majority party in a particular house.
14. Oregon’s legislative rules currently give undue authority to its presiding officers, who can easily use these rules to control both committee assignments
and the movement of legislation in a way that demands loyalty from majority
party members and that excludes members of the minority party from a meaningful role in the legislative process.
15. The strong leader system fosters excessive partisanship by rewarding a winnertakes-all approach to controlling the Senate and House of Representatives.
16. Ostensibly nonpartisan administrative staff officers are subject to the imperatives of the party in control of a particular house.
17. While committees remain important in the Legislature, their power has somewhat diminished because of the increasing power of the caucuses.
18. Courteous and extensive working relationships among experienced legislators
contribute to good deliberation.
19. The Legislature has experienced an unraveling of relationships, which has
inhibited its ability to function well as a deliberative body.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Administration of the Legislature
1.

The Legislature should hold pre-session conference retreats to provide more
training and more opportunities for legislators to forge lasting and productive
professional relationships across party lines.

2.

The Legislature should continue to build upon its efforts to conduct legislative
business in communities throughout the state and to publish information and
proceedings online.

Legislative Rules and Procedures
3.

The House and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that establish proportional representation of party members on committees and permit the leaders
of each caucus to determine which of its members to appoint to committees.
When making committee assignments, caucus leaders should take into account the experience, interest and seniority of legislators.

4.

The House and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that require the vicechair of each committee to be a member of the minority party, and committee
chairs should consult with vice-chairs in developing committee agendas.

5.

While the House’s Teamwork Bill is a step in the right direction, the House
and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that allow each member of the
Legislature to require a committee hearing on a predetermined number of bills
during each legislative session.

6.

The House should maintain and the Senate should adopt rules permitting
a majority of each of their members to require a committee or floor hearing on a bill. In addition, the House and Senate should adopt and maintain
rules permitting a substantial minority of each of their members to require a
committee or floor hearing on a bill that has already been passed by the other
chamber.

7.

The House should maintain and the Senate should adopt rules ensuring that
the Secretary of the Senate and the Chief Clerk of the House are nonpartisan
and serve members of both parties, not at the sole discretion of the presiding
officers. In addition, the House and Senate should employ permanent staff
with knowledge of substantive policy areas to support the work of committees.

8.

Once the above rules are adopted, the House and Senate should require a supermajority to change these and other rules that protect each member’s right
to participate in the legislative process.
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Constitutional Amendments
9.

The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment establishing
a nonpartisan redistricting commission.

10. The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment that would
establish annual legislative sessions of limited length, commencing in March,
shortly after the state Office of Economic Analysis releases its first revenue
projections for the year.
11. The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment that would
establish four-year terms for members of the House of Representatives and
six-year terms for members of the Senate.
Further Study and Advocacy
12. City Club of Portland should establish a research committee to study alternative election systems.
13. City Club of Portland should establish a research committee to prepare a detailed recommendation for a nonpartisan redistricting commission.
14. City Club should support efforts to increase substantive and objective policy
news reporting in the media.

Respectfully submitted,
Tony Iaccarino, research & policy director
Morgan O’Toole-Smith, research adviser
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APPENDIX A: COMMITTEE CHARGE,
MEMBERSHIP AND PROCESS
After interviewing four leading Oregon political figures to understand better how
partisan behavior influences the Oregon political system, City Club’s Research Board
and Board of Governors charged your committee with determining if and when
partisan behavior is an impediment to effective governance and, if so, what should
be done about it. The primary objectives of the study were to “(1) define partisanship
and investigate its impact on Oregon’s political system and state government’s ability
to effectively govern and resolve key issues and (2) recommend possible solutions
for any negative impacts of partisanship, as well as ways to support elements of the
political system that should be continued.”
Your committee, which convened in October 2005, includes fourteen City Club members who applied for membership on the committee and were screened for conflicts
of interest. Your committee includes members of both major political parties and
nonaffiliated voters — registered voters who are not members of any political party.
At the outset of this study, your committee acknowledged the difficulties inherent in
analyzing partisanship without reference to individual beliefs or biases. Nevertheless,
the members of your committee endeavored to conduct its inquiry in a fair and objective manner. Every effort was made to ensure that your committee’s research and
deliberations reflected an open, honest and rigorous analysis of this complex issue.
Your committee gave time and attention to understanding the perspectives of both
major political parties, as well as the points of view of people from urban, suburban
and rural Oregon.
Your committee met weekly to conduct its research and prepare this report. Your
committee interviewed 41 witnesses including political scientists, lobbyists, pollsters,
members of the Senate and House of Representatives, legislative staff, directors of
political parties, members of the media, and former officeholders (Appendix B). Members of your committee participated in or observed meetings of different political
groups. In addition, committee members considered relevant scholarly material and
monitored media statewide for contemporary information related to the study topic
(Appendix C).
Your committee also closely monitored the proceedings of the Public Commission on
the Oregon Legislature. The Commission was created by the 73rd Legislature in Senate Bill 1084, which passed both houses and was signed by the governor in July 2005.
All 30 members of the Commission were approved by both the Democratic President
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of the Senate and by the Republican Speaker of the House. The work of the Commission was the first review of its kind since 1974. It was given the broad charge of seeking ways to improve the Legislature’s “administration, procedures, facilities, staffing
and overall capacity” to ensure “that the Legislature can meet the increasing demands
of legislative work and perform its functions as an equal and coordinate branch of
state government.” The Commission adopted its final report on November 13, 2006.
Many of the subjects considered by the Commission were beyond the scope of your
committee’s study of partisanship. This report highlights those recommendations of
the Commission that relate to the subject of partisanship. (See Appendix D.)
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APPENDIX B: WITNESSES
Titles listed below are those held at time of interview:
Vic Atiyeh
Vic Backlund
Dave Barrows
Charles Beggs
Bill Bradbury
Kate Brown
Richard Clucas
Peter Courtney
Robert Eisinger
Sal Esquivel
Ted Ferrioli
Mike Greenfield
Paul Gronke
Judy Hall
Tim Hibbitts
Phil Keisling
Ramona Kenady
Amy Langdon
Hans Linde
Bill Lunch
Jeff Mapes
Pat McCormick
Jeff Merkley
Bob Moore
Hardy Myers
Troy Nichols
Robert Packwood
Norma Paulus
Neel Pender
Eileen Qutub
Charles Ringo
Barbara Roberts
Jim Scherzinger
Wayne Scott
Lane Shetterly

Former Governor, State of Oregon
Former Representative, State of Oregon
Lobbyist, Dave Barrows & Associates
Former journalist, Associated Press
Secretary of State, State of Oregon
Senate Majority Leader, State of Oregon
Political scientist, Portland State University
President of the Senate, State of Oregon
Political scientist, Lewis & Clark College
Representative, State of Oregon
Senate Minority Leader, State of Oregon
Former legislative administrator, State of Oregon
Political scientist, Reed College
Secretary of the Senate, State of Oregon
Opinion researcher, Davis, Hibbitts & Midghall, Inc.
Former Secretary of State, State of Oregon
Chief Clerk of the House, State of Oregon
Former Executive Director, Oregon Republican Party
Former Supreme Court Justice, State of Oregon
Political scientist, Oregon State University
Journalist, The Oregonian
Lobbyist, Conkling, Fiskum & McCormick, Inc.
Speaker of the House, State of Oregon
Opinion researcher, Moore Information, Inc.
Attorney General, State of Oregon
Staff, Oregon House of Representatives
Former state legislator and U.S. Senator
Former Secretary of State, State of Oregon
Former Executive Director, Oregon Democratic Party
Former Representative and Senator, State of Oregon
Former Senator, State of Oregon
Former Governor, State of Oregon
Former member, Legislative Revenue Committee
Representative, State of Oregon
Former Representative; Director, Land Conservation and 		
Development Commission, State of Oregon
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Mike Thorne
Tony Van Vliet
Ben Westlund
Max Williams
Peter Wong
Duncan Wyse

Former Senator, State of Oregon
Former Representative, State of Oregon
Senator, State of Oregon
Former Representative; Director, Department of Corrections,
State of Oregon
Journalist, Statesman Journal
President, Oregon Business Council

In addition, members of your committee attended the 2006 Dorchester Conference in
Seaside, Oregon, where your committee hosted an open discussion of partisanship in
the Legislature, and other members of your committee attended the 2006 Money In
Politics Research Action Forum (MiPRAP) and the Oregon Alliance to Reform Media
Conference, “Our Media Our Democracy Action Forum.”
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APPENDIX D: SELECTED
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PUBLIC
COMMISSION ON THE OREGON
LEGISLATURE, 2006
The Public Commission on the Oregon Legislature made twenty-four recommendations. They are grouped into four main categories: Recommendations for Fundamental Reform, Recommendations for Institutional Reform, Recommendations for
Reforming Legislative Operations, and Recommendations for Improving Facilities
and Technology. The following are the recommendations relating to issues discussed
in this report. The full list of recommendations made by the Public Commission is
available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/pcol/home.htm.

Recommendations for Fundamental Reform
Open Primary*
•

Oregon should adopt an “open” primary, allowing all Oregon voters to nominate
two candidates to appear on the general election ballot regardless of political
party affiliation, or lack of party affiliation, of the elector or candidate.

Nonpartisan Legislature
•

Members of each house should determine whether they want to be elected with
partisan labels. One house may choose to be nonpartisan and the other not.
However, both houses and the Governor would need to approve legislation to
modify the definition of “nonpartisan” office.

Nonpartisan State Controller
•

Create a nonpartisan statewide State Controller, to be selected in a manner determined by law, to manage, administer and oversee state elections and elections
policy, campaign finance administration, investigations including elections and
ethics issues, and legislative redistricting. . . . Redistricting will be managed by
the State Controller consistent with the recommendations made in a separate
proposal for a five-member redistricting commission. . . . The State Controller’s

* The PCOL used the term “open primary” loosely. In essence, the PCOL called for what is more
commonly understood, in the political science literature, as a “top-two primary”.
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term of office should be no fewer than six years. The office holder will be barred
from seeking statewide elected office until two years after the expiration of the
six-year term.
Redistricting Commission
•

Establish a redistricting commission responsible for drafting legislative and
congressional district plans under administration of the State Controller, a new
position.

Initiative Reform
•

Require citizen initiative or referendum chief petitioner(s) to be registered voters
in Oregon. . . .

•

Require a notarized statement indicating the identities and physical addresses
of the top five contributors to a ballot measure signature-gathering effort to be
disclosed in the Voters’ Pamphlet. . . .

•

Establish a regular process for considering and possibly taking legislative action
on initiative proposals. . . .

Campaign Finance
•

Appoint a Commission on Campaign Finance Reform to examine the role of campaign finance in legislative decision-making. Reform the use of campaign funds
by candidates and elected officials. Improve legislator compensation in conjunction with reforms related to use of campaign funds by candidates and elected
officials. Consider moving the primary election date to the first Tuesday in June
or August.

Legislator Compensation
•

The Public Officials Compensation Commission (POCC) should be given responsibility for establishing salaries for state elected officials, removing political consideration from that process. The commission will set salaries for: the Governor;
Secretary of State; State Treasurer; Attorney General; Superintendent of Public
Instruction; Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries; Judges of the
Supreme Court; Judges of the Court of Appeals; Circuit Court Judges; Tax Court
Judges; District Attorneys and Legislators. Salaries of elected officials should
be based on the duties of the office and at a level that will attract citizens of the
highest quality to public service.
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Recommendations for Institutional Reform
Annual Sessions and Session Structure
•

The Legislative Assembly should establish a new meeting time for the 2007
legislative session and hold a legislative session in 2008. The Legislature must determine how and whether it is desirable to have annual sessions beginning with
the 2009 session.

Partisanship
•

Presiding officers should, in practice, represent the body as a whole, and not
use authority to prevent debate. Develop a more collaborative environment for
discussions by majority and minority leadership regarding legislative priorities.
Establish collaborative processes that include the minority in session management. Allow measures, with demonstrable evidence of a majority of members in
support, to move to the floor for debate and vote. House and Senate Rules should
not be used for the purpose of foreclosing access to significant policy issues.
Require Vice-Chairs to be from minority parties.

Staffing Legislative Offices
•

Separate issue-area staff and committee staff in an effort to professionalize issuearea staff, make them more accessible to all members, and acknowledge relationships between chairs and committee staff.

Public Access
•

The Legislative Assembly should take steps to improve public access to the legislative process, including providing more notice about committee meetings and
consideration of legislation.

Recommendations for Reforming Legislative Operations
Committees
•

Enhance legislator orientation curriculum to include more training in subject
matter and procedural areas. Require comprehensive work plans for interim
committees that prepare members for upcoming sessions. Increase continuity of
both members and staff from session to interim committees. Maximize use of
work groups and emphasize breadth of membership to reflect as many viewpoints in a policy discussion as possible. Require minority parties to select their
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committee members in proportion to membership of the body. Require presiding
officers and members of each body to “institutionalize” the appointment of one
or more members of a minority party to chair one or more significant committees or subcommittees. Keep the ability to open or reopen committees when
needed during session to ensure that legislators experienced in particular subject
areas are working on related bills. Establish and adhere to deadlines for committee actions including bill introductions, hearing deadlines, work session deadlines and chamber cross-over dates. Make investments in the above items.

Recommendations for Improving Facilities and Technology
Oregon Channel
•

The Legislature should assist in funding the Oregon Channel Pilot Program during the 2007 legislative session to determine the utility of unedited coverage of
legislative meetings and other public affairs events, such as agency meetings or
Supreme Court arguments on a dedicated Public Broadcasting television channel.
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APPENDIX E: OREGON GOVERNORS
AND LEGISLATIVE LEADERS, 1953-2009
Year

47

1953

Paul Patterson (R)

Eugene Marsh,
McMinnville (R)

Rudie Wilhelm,
Portland (R)

100

48

1955

Paul Patterson (R)

Elmo Smith,
John Day, (R)

Edward Geary,
Klamath Falls (R)

115

49

1957

Robert Holmes (D)

Boyd Overhulse,
Madras (D)

Pat Dooley, Portland (D)

128

50

1959

Mark Hatfield (R)

Walter Pearson,
Portland (D)

Robert Duncan,
Medford (D)

115

51

1961

Mark Hatfield (R)

Jean Lewis,
Portland (D)
& Ben Musa,
The Dalles (D)

Robert Duncan,
Medford (D)

124

52

1963

Mark Hatfield (R)

Ben Musa,
The Dalles (D)

Clarence Barton,
Coquille (D)

143

53

1965

Mark Hatfield (R)

Harry Boivin, Klamath Falls (D)

F. F. Montgomery,
Eugene (R)

127

54

1967

Tom McCall (R)

E.D. Potts,
Grants Pass (D)

F. F. Montgomery,
Eugene (R)

157

55

1969

Tom McCall (R)

E.D. Potts,
Grants Pass (D)

Roger F. Smith,
Burns (R)

131

56

1971

Tom McCall (R)

John D. Burns,
Portland (D)

Roger F. Smith,
Burns (R)

151

57

1973

Tom McCall (R)

Jason Boe,
Reedsport (D)

Richard Eymann,
Springfield (D)

180

58

1975

Bob Straub (D)

Jason Boe,
Reedsport (D)

Phil Lang,
Portland (D)

153

59

1977

Bob Straub (D)

Jason Boe,
Reedsport (D)

Phil Lang,
Portland (D)

177

60

1979

Vic Atiyeh (R)

Jason Boe,
Reedsport (D)

Hardy Meyers,
Portland (D)

178

Governor

Senate
President

Length of
Session
(Days)

Leg.
#
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Year

61

1981

Vic Atiyeh (R)

Fred W. Heard,
Klamath Falls (D)

Vern Meyers,
Springfield (R)

202

62

1983

Vic Atiyeh (R)

Ed Fadeley,
Eugene (D)

Grattan Kerans,
Eugene (D)

187

63

1985

Vic Atiyeh (R)

John Kitzhaber,
Roseburg (D)

Vera Katz,
Portland (D)

159

64

1987

Neil Goldschmidt
(D)

John Kitzhaber,
Roseburg (D)

Vera Katz,
Portland (D)

168

65

1989

Neil Goldschmidt
(D)

John Kitzhaber,
Roseburg (D)

Vera Katz,
Portland (D)

177

66

1991

Barbara Roberts (D)

John Kitzhaber,
Roseburg (D)

Larry Campbell,
Eugene (R)

168

67

1993

Barbara Roberts (D)

Bill Bradbury,
Bandon (D)

Larry Campbell,
Eugene (R)

207

68

1995

John Kitzhaber (D)

Gordon Smith,
Pendleton (R)

Bev Clarno,
Bend (R)

153

69

1997

John Kitzhaber (D)

Brady Adams,
Salem (R)

Lynn Lundquist,
Powell Butte (R)

174

70

1999

John Kitzhaber (D)

Brady Adams,
Salem (R)

Lynn Snodgrass,
Clackamas (R)

195

71

2001

John Kitzhaber (D)

Gene Derfler,
Salem (R)

Mark Simmons,
Elgin (R)

181

72

2003

Ted Kulongoski (D)

Peter Courtney,
Salem (D)

Karen Minnis,
Fairview (R)

227

73

2005

Ted Kulongoski (D)

Peter Courtney,
Salem (D)

Karen Minnis,
Fairview (R)

204

74

2007

Ted Kulongoski (D)

Peter Courtney,
Salem (D)

Jeff Merkley,
Portland (D)

172

75

2009

Ted Kulongoski (D)

Peter Courtney,
Salem (D)

Dave Hunt,
Clackamas (D)

Governor

Senate
President

Length of
Session
(Days)

Leg.
#
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